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Abstract 
 
Flexicurity has come to be known as the new solution to the unemployment problems 
in Europe. The reason for this is that it has taken credit for the fall in the Danish 
unemployment in 1994. This paper analyses whether there is any truth to this 
assessment. Further more it develops a post Keynesian perspective to uncover 
alternative explanations low unemployment in Denmark. The analysis is then discussed 
in a European context. This is done comparing the real abilities of the Danish 
flexicurity model in reaching the Lisbon Strategy’s goal of 70% employment in 2010. 
In doing so we’ll incorporate the obstacles posed by the Stability and Growth Pact and 
the European Central Bank. Finally we discuss an alternative way of reducing the 
employment problem in Europe through a Post Keynesian critique. 
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1. Research area 
A spectre is haunting the European Union – the spectre of economic stagnation. There 
is a general consensus among the leaders of Europe that the spectre needs to be 
exorcised, and so there have been for some time. The economy of the countries in the 
Euro-area did only grow with 1.3% from 2004-05, as compared to the US growth of 
3.5% and the Japanese 2.7%, and the stagnation is starting to take its toll on what ought 
to be the drivers of the European economy (OECD 2006: 267) In Germany, protesters 
gather in the streets demanding reforms and in France, the suburbs burn. It is especially 
the high unemployment rate with the 2004 average of 9.2% in the Euro-area, which 
seems to be at the root of the economic problems (OECD 2005: 41). 
There is a demand for solutions to the high employment. Often the instruments to boost 
the economy are the four macroeconomic tools: monetary policy, fiscal policy, 
exchange rate policy and pay-/incomes policy (Jespersen 2004: 133). Three of these are 
bound by the EMU and the Stability and Growth Pact. National sovereignty over 
monetary and exchange rate policies are pooled and given to the European Central 
Bank (ECB), which decides a common policy for the whole Euro-area. Fiscal policy is 
officially bound by the controversial Stability and Growth Pact, which obliges the 
Member States to restrain from expansive fiscal policy. However the pact might prove 
to be just as successful as the European Constitution, and the European Defence Treaty 
of 1952, since it was not possible to enforce either of the pacts upon France and 
Germany. This leaves the pay-/incomes policy as the sole instrument where the nation 
state retains full sovereignty.  
The benefits of having a single currency are many, and trade ought to improve between 
the Member States by decreasing transaction costs, reducing price uncertainty and 
improving price transparency inside the community, as well as the prospect of the Euro 
becoming a truly international currency with an expanding financial industry as a 
consequence (De Grauwe 2005: 67-84). These benefits are, however yet to be seen. 
 
The ECB could loosen the monetary policy to stimulate the economy of Europe in an 
old fashioned way. However the ECB is fixated on keeping a tight monetary policy to 
keep inflation under control and insure low prices and this doesn’t help the stagnating 
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EU, whereas high employment and stabilisation of the business cycles is secondary 
objectives (De Grauwe 2005: 164). Simultaneously the Stability and Growth pact 
might be weakened, but it is still up and running, making an expansive financial policy 
much harder to use. The policies of the ECB are not so easily changed, since it is 
independent of any political or democratic control. The problems of the ECB have been 
widely criticised, among others by OECD who traditionally advocates a tight monetary 
policy, but a year ago the organisation stated that the ECB could loosen it’s grip a bit 
without fearing massive inflation (Politiken 14/03/06). Also it is doubtful that the 
leaders of Europe would boost the economy if they could, because of the scepticism in 
mainstream economics of using simple demand boosting as a problem solver. 
 
For now, however, there is no prospect of change within the ECB or the Stability and 
Growth Pact. So can the leaders of Europe, solve their crisis within the conditions that 
the EMU has created? The single most ambitious project aimed at solving the 
unemployment problem has been the Lisbon Strategy, which was initiated in 2000. The 
Lisbon Strategy set the goal of transforming the EU into “the world’s most dynamic 
and competitive economy” before 2010. Inspired by the writings of Joseph 
Schumpeter, this was to be done by making Europe a knowledge-based economy with 
innovation as the driving force (Wikipedia.org 08/03/06) . 
When it comes to lowering the unemployment in Europe, the Lisbon Strategy in 
particular stresses a need for workers and employers to be flexible and adaptable. It 
also stresses a need to strike a proper balance between security in employment 
contracts, as well as a need for an enhancement of the quality of job so that not only 
more jobs are created but also better jobs (growthandjobs 02/05/2006), and it call upon 
the workers and unions to show wage restrains in labour market negotiations. The 
Lisbon Strategy isn’t a specific action plan, but more of a set of common goals. The 
implementation of the strategy is based on the open method of coordination and is thus 
open for interpretation and might differ a lot from member state to member state and 
has to take the country specific conditions into consideration. The Lisbon Strategy has 
yet to shown significant results, and it is dubious if the ambitious goal will be reached, 
but the goal of an EU employment rating of 70% in 2010 have not been abandoned yet. 
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The goal’s are still to be reach by using best practices, and in the search for a role 
model the eyes of Lisbon have fallen upon Denmark, since this country have been able 
to deal with the problems of unemployment, and at the same time keep inflation at an 
acceptable level. This has introduced a concept that has become a buzzword in labour 
market reform, ‘flexicurity’:  
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Figure 1 - The official (open) unemployment rate in Denmark (Statistics Denmark) 
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Figure 2 - Employment in Denmark  
Statistics Denmark does not have a consistent total employment number, so therefore OECD has been 
used in this case (OECD, 2005: 18-19). Total full-time employment is however from Statistics Denmark. 
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(Statistics Denmark) 
 
 
Figure 3 - The Danish Phillips-curve 1956-2002 (Kongshøj 2005: 10)  
What makes Denmark interesting is that it has a labour market that combines a level of 
flexibility comparable to the labour markets of the United Kingdom and Ireland, with 
one of the most generous unemployment benefit systems in the world and with a pro-
active labour market policy. The model has been christened ‘flexicurity’ as a 
contraction of flexibility and security, and it has become a buzzword all over Europe.  
In Italy, the newly elected Prime Minister Romano Prodi, has several times during his 
election campaign shown interest in adopting the Danish model to combat Italy’s 
unemployment (Politiken 04/03/06). In Germany, the grand coalition of conservatives 
and social democrats, has agreed that Germany is to become a flexicurity country. In 
France, Prime Minister Dominique de Villepin has used flexicurity as validation for the 
now-dead policy proposal, which would implement an extreme flexibility in labour 
market of young people (Politiken 14/03/06). Even “The Economist”, a well know 
free-market advocate, has accentuated the advantages of the flexicurity model 
(Economist 22-28/04/06). There is little doubt that flexicurity has become a byword for 
reform when the agenda is set on the European labour.  
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Why flexicurity has become so popular and seen as a role model, has to due with the 
way it balances between three components: 
Flexibility: The flexicurity model is all about adaptability to a changing economy. The 
demand for goods and services in modern capitalism is ever changing and far from 
predictable. The future market is bound by an inherent uncertainty, and therefore the 
businesses need flexibility in order to adapt to a changing demand. In the flexicurity 
model, the flexibility is primarily achieved by liberal employment regulations that 
make it easy for the businesses to hire and fire workers. This makes it less risky for a 
firm to hire new workers to meet a sudden demand of the goods or services it provides, 
since it can easily fire the abundant workers if the market suddenly changes in an 
unfavourable way. Unfortunately this kind of flexibility creates a negative externality 
in form of uncertainty for the workers, who can’t be certain that they can keep their 
standard of living since they never know if they will be begging on the streets the next 
month.  
Security: The high uncertainty can be combated by increasing the security of the 
workers. In the central European states this is often done by making it costly for the 
employers to fire the workers, such as three years of full salary to the fired worker, but 
this counteracts the hire and fire flexibility. In the Danish flexicurity model, a generous 
welfare system paid by the labour unions and the state substitute roughly 80% of the 
unemployed workers previous salary, thereby relieving the economic problems of 
unemployment and thereby it reduces the uncertainty of the workers. Increased security 
also makes the high flexibility more acceptable for the workers and their unions. If the 
social security net is strong, it can even improve the match between workers and jobs 
as the unemployed workers has more incentive to wait for the right job to come along, 
instead of taking the first job offer he gets, which might not suit his skills. However a 
generous welfare system might also produce a negative externality in the form of less 
incentive to work, especially for the low income groups, for whom there isn’t much 
profit to be earned by working than being on unemployment benefits. 
Active labour market policy: The last aspect of the flexicurity model combats the 
negative incentive by making it unpleasant to be on unemployment benefits. After a 
few years the unemployed worker is put in activation programs. The activation is 
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mandatory and usually takes the form of simple monotonous tasks. Thus the 
unemployed worker gains nothing if he is voluntarily unemployed and thus might as 
well find a real job. But hardly all unemployed persons have chosen unemployment 
and a lot are involuntarily without a job, often because they can’t offer much to the 
businesses. The active labour market policy has a second and just as important part, 
which deals with this problem. It involves upgrading the skills of the unemployed. This 
ought to increase the knowledge and productivity of the unemployed workers and 
thereby make them more attractive to hire. The upgrading of skills is done by both 
traditional education and the activation programs that give the unemployed workers 
practical experience. Focusing on skills that is in demand by the businesses can even 
enhance the flexibility of the overall economy. The active labour marked policies also 
include vocation training in order to prevent that the skills of employed workers 
becomes obsolete 
These three elements of the flexicurity model form a ‘golden triangle’, which all 
together creates an employment system that is adaptable to changes: 
 
Figure 4, the golden triangle of flexicurity 
(Konghøj 2005: 11) 
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It is no wonder then that the flexicurity model has attracted the eyes of the European 
leaders. It has high flexibility and increases market adaptability which the creators of 
the Lisbon Strategy and supporters of liberal free-markets advocate for and it has a 
high worker security, which pleases the advocates of a more socially coherent Europe. 
Flexicurity seems to be the grand compromise of the European labour marked. 
If flexicurity can do all the things it promises, then it would be hard to stop the 
celebration of the golden triangle. But before the flexicurity is naively praised as 
another golden calf, one has to ask if flexicurity is really such a glorious model? Its 
merits and limitations needs to be uncovered through a critical assessment, before it 
can be stated whether or not flexicurity really can rectify the unemployment problems 
of Europe. A common validation of flexicurity is the sudden drop in unemployment 
that Denmark experienced from 1993 and onward (see  figure 1), this drop coincides 
with the reforms of the Danish flexicurity model, which came into effect in January 
1994, and which was designed to boost the efficiency of the active labour market 
policy (Kongshøj 2005:16). At a glance it seems to support the merits of the flexicurity 
model, but just because the reforms happened simultaneously with a drop in the 
unemployment it doesn’t necessarily make it the cause of it. So it has to be clarified 
whether or not the flexicurity reforms really caused the drop in unemployment.  
Understanding the Danish flexicurity is therefore the focal point of this paper. In 
addition to the former questions others have to be asked as well in order to provide an 
understanding of flexicurity: What is the historical context of the model? Is flexicurity 
the reason why Denmark has enjoyed a relatively low unemployment? Does the 
centralised collective wage agreements, a unique feature of the Danish labour market, 
have any notably role to play in relation to flexicurity? Is flexicurity so embedded in its 
context that it cannot be exported, or is it something which can potentially be used 
elsewhere?  
All these different questions should make it possible to answer the main research 
question: 
 
What are the perspectives of flexicurity to secure the employment goals of the Lsbon 
Strategy? 
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2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Research question and working questions. 
The core of the research question is flexicurity, and the project will  be concentrated 
around the Danish flexicurity model, refined by the 1994 labour market reform. The 
project will consist of a thorough investigation of flexicurity, in order to define the 
concept and its functionality. In relation to EU, flexicurity has caught the attention of 
the other Member States, and has after the Wim Kok report been made the bench mark 
for the proposed goals of the Lisbon Strategy. These events form the basis of our 
interest in examining the concept of flexicurity as a mean to meet the goals of the 
Lisbon Strategy, as expressed in the research question. When the question referrers to 
the Lisbon employment goals, it should be seen in the light of the recent discussions 
about whether the Lisbon Strategy will manage to fulfil these goals before 2010. The 
research question should therefore be understood as a critical examination of, to what 
extent, the flexicurity could be an additional instrument, in fighting the European 
unemployment problem.  
 
2.2. Working Questions and sub questions 
That the flexicurity model is the reason why the Danish unemployment has been 
relatively low compared to other welfare states in Europe is an assumption, which has 
become ‘conventional wisdom’. The flexicurity model’s alleged ability to bring down 
unemployment has made it a buzzword in the debate about labour market reforms. The 
assumption is largely based on the events in 1994, where the unemployment rate 
dropped dramatically and the total employment increased, as seen in figure 2. The fall 
coincides with the reforms of the Danish flexicurity model, which came in effect in 
January 1994 and was designed to enhance the efficiency of the active labour market 
policy. So perhaps it is no wonder that the assumption that the two are connected is so 
common, but just because the two coincide doesn’t mean that they are intertwined. 
(Kongshøj, 2005:16). 
Since the success in the Danish labour market, has largely been attributed to the merits 
of the flexicurity system, and since the main research question is whether flexicurity 
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can help reach the employment goals of the Lisbon Strategy. it has to be clarified what 
caused the apparent success in 1993 if we are to determine if flexicurity did lower the 
unemployment, or if there is more to the story. This leads to the first working question:  
1. Does flexicurity work? 
This question alone does not give all the prerequisites needed, in order to answer the 
main research question. We need to create an understanding of the full extent of the 
flexicurity model to see what makes it ‘tick’. Understanding flexicurity should make it 
possible to determine the merits of flexicurity, and which factors that have to be taken 
into consideration if it is to work properly. Therefore the following two sub questions 
have been elaborated in order to answer the first working question: 
1.1 How can flexicurity be defined in a Danish context? 
1.2 Did flexicurity cause the significant fall in unemployment in 1994? 
 
These two questions will supplement each other in analysing the concept of flexicurity. 
They ought to present the insights needed in order to understand the role of flexicurity 
in the Danish labour market, if it is as magnificent as some believe and ultimately how 
it can solve the problems of the European labour markets. 
When the concept is brought into the European context, it will be analysed in the 
context of the Lisbon Strategy’s employment goal. Therefore a second working 
question has been established to guide the analysis of flexicuritys’ capacities in coping 
with unemployment at a European level: 
 
2. Which problems can flexicurity solve, in relation to the unemployment problems of 
the EMU- zone? 
 
The second working question requires an analysis of the goals set by the Lisbon 
Strategy in relation to the constraints set by the Stability and Growth Pact. Based on 
this a discussion of the extent to which flexicurity can compensate for the lacking 
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progress of the Lisbon Strategy, will be conducted. The identification of the arguments, 
will provide the instruments necessary in answering the research question. 
 
2.3. Theory of science- Critical Realism 
Macroeconomics is, in broad terms, the object of this research. Due to the fact, that 
more approaches are available, when investigating macro-economics, it is important to 
make the underlying assumptions and meta-theoretical considerations explicit. The 
meta-theoretical approach applied in the project is inspired by the critical realism and 
macroeconomic methodology, described by Tony Lawson and Jesper Jespersen. The 
main arguments presented in these theories, will be illuminated in this chapter, to 
provide an understanding of the reasoning used in conducting our research.  
 
2.3.1. Macroeconomics 
Macroeconomics is about observing effects and finding explanations at an aggregate 
economic level, i.e. analysing the economy as a whole “They  (macroeconomic 
aggregates) are, of course, the outcome of millions of individually decided transactions, 
which quite often may deviate from the individually intended, not to speak of optimal 
behaviour analysed in standard micro economic lectures” (Jesper Jespersen 1, 2005 
:2). The labour market is an economic aggregate and the workings of the flexicurity 
can therefore be analysed using a macroeconomic methodology.  
The problem inherent in macroeconomic analysis is, that even though trends are partly 
visible through data, no explanation is necessarily clear, as seen in the Danish 
unemployment drop in 1993. Thus when seeking macroeconomic explanations, a 
methodology, capable of observing the nature of macroeconomic aggregates, is needed. 
The mainstream methodology is mathematical-deductivist, as the one applied in 
neoclassical methods, based on the general equilibrium model. Critical realism is 
strongly opposed to this methodology, as the mathematical deductions implies to many 
unrealistic assumptions, such as event repetitiveness and the assumption that economic 
agents always behave rationally. In addition the theory uncritically converts social 
behaviour into mathematical models, in a manner that oversimplifies and presupposes 
social behaviour, which creates a closed system that lacks the ability to incorporate an 
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ever changing social world (Lawson 2003:10)1. Furthermore, the critics point out that 
mathematical deduction is directed at attempts to predict the future, which become 
imprecise, as the predictions are based on conditions only valid at the time of creation. 
The equilibrium models tend to isolate phenomena wherefore context specific 
explanatory factors are left out; hence the models are unable to capture more aspects of 
reality, which is necessary if a broader picture of the phenomena is needed. Critical 
realism acknowledges the complexity of macroeconomics and therefore critical 
realistic research requires a broader analysis of the area investigated. Lawson explains 
the role of the critical realistic economist: “…economists must, at a minimum, show a 
far greater sensitivity to context and adopt significantly broader, more critical, 
orientations to theorising and explaining than are currently in evidence” (Lawson 
1997: XI).  
Doing research within the area of the labour market as in this project is perceived as 
investigating an area, which partly consists of economic factors, but also of social 
processes such as bargaining among the labour market partners, for contacts, wages 
and work conditions. Since the research question asks for a critical analysis, based on 
theoretical explanations of both economic and social scientific nature, the critical 
realistic approach is found to be the adequate methodology for the research conducted. 
 
2.3.2. Ontology 
Ontology concerns the foundation of the subject analysed. Critical realism relies on a 
realistic ontology, where the macroeconomic reality is perceived as existing 
independently of the observer, i.e. there is a structure in the millions of transactions 
made. Such a structure, which constitutes macroeconomics, is so complex that it is 
almost beyond comprehension and therefore an open ontology is needed in order to 
understand the relation between the different complex elements composing the macro 
economy. The macroeconomic landscape investigated through out the project is the 
Danish flexicurity model, and the project seeks to generate a picture of the institutions, 
                                                 
1 It would however be wrong to state that Lawson absolutely rejects mathematical methods in 
economics. Mathematical models does have many advantages, but assuming that economic behaviour 
can be reduced mathematics is wrong and the macroeconomic aggregates cannot be reduced to the sum 
of rational actions performed at micro level. A much more complex view has to be adopted.  
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processes, actors and structures composing flexicurity and the Danish labour market as 
such (Jespersen 1 2005: 3). Working within an open ontology requires an 
interdisciplinary approach to describe and explain the complex area, wherefore both 
economic and institutional theories, take up a central position in the research 
conducted. Observing the empirical world is as important as the theoretical approaches 
applied, and in order to understand the relation between theory and empirical data in 
the project, the open ontology has to be explained.   
 
The fact that critical realism highlights the complex and uncertain nature of 
macroeconomics, the ontology needs to be stratified (Fuglsang & Bitch Olsen 2004: 
164). In other words, the ontology is divided into three levels, in order to perceive the 
complexity of the whole landscape and give a causal explanation to the subject 
analysed:  
 
Empirical level  Observable data and experiences 
(unprecise measures) 
Actual level Actual events and tendencies (The 
genuine event) 
Transcendental level Structures, forces and mechanisms 
(abstract structures).  
Fig. 5, based on data from (Lawson 1997: 22 and Jespersen 2 :5).  
 
The first (empirical) level is impressions and experiences. This level represents events, 
as they are experienced i.e. the surface of phenomenons with no causal explanation that 
appears directly from the observed event. The empirical layer would, in the context of 
this project be the drop of unemployment in 1993, a drop that doesn’t carry an inherent 
causal explanation. Furthermore, in this level there is also the impression that 
flexicurity is a model capable of lowering unemployment. 
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The second (actual) level is the actual state of affairs. This level represents the real 
events, i.e. events in themselves. The level is needed because experience and 
impressions are not equal to what actually happens per se. It is in here that the critical 
element is particularly visible in critical realism. Just because something appears to us 
doesn’t necessarily make it true. The statistics show that unemployment dropped in 
1993, but that doesn’t necessarily make it true. Thus a critical perception of 
impressions has to be adopted, and one has to ask what actually happened.  
The third transcendental level is the most inaccessible layer of reality. It is in this level 
causal explanations and mechanisms are embedded. The third layer contains 
underlying mechanisms. Mechanisms are social structures that have been triggered and 
cause an empirical event to be observable: “Mechanisms exist as causal power of 
things. Powers of structured things are usually exercised only as a result of some 
input…Mechanisms when triggered (where relevant) have effect” ( Lawson 1997: 21) 
The crucial difference between the second and the third layer is that the third layer is 
not observable. One has to imagine the structure that connects the events. Flexicurity 
exists in the third layer, because flexicurity is an abstract conceptualised structure, 
which apparently has caused the low unemployment in Denmark.  
The open ontology, is structured, and the structures posses causal powers which, when 
triggered, act as generative mechanisms to determine the actual phenomena of the 
world. To understand the events observed at the empirical level which in our case is the 
effects of the 1994 flexicurity reform, one has to generate knowledge, which enables 
the observer to get, as close as possible, to the mechanisms, in the transcendent layer, 
generating the events. 
 
2.3.3. Retroduction 
The stratification of the ontology requires a methodology, which can provide a path, to 
come as close to the transcendent level as it is possible. A possible instrument is 
retroduction, that is a systemised way of gaining knowledge by combining the three 
standard modes of inference (abduction, induction and deduction) which is especially 
useful to explain unique phenomena that is not expected to repeat itself. (Lawson 
2003:97) 
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When an answer is needed to a research question about some peculiarity in the social 
world, the explanation ought to give some insight into the world, that surrounds the 
question. In the natural science the methodology can normally be founded on different 
experimental situations, where as many variables as possible are eliminated until a 
single one can be pinpointed and explained as the cause of the peculiarity. This is, 
however, impossible in a social world characterised by an open and dynamic ontology, 
and therefore the investigated peculiarity might be unique. Instead a different approach 
has to be used, which originates from the stratified ontology.  
 
First of all one has to be critical when looking at empirical ‘facts’ such as statistics. 
The conclusions drawn from empirical observations should be as well founded as 
possible, this is done by eliminating as many ‘what if’s as possible. By imagining 
different possible explanations and following the effects of different lines of thought, it 
should be possible to give an accurate account of what in fact happens in the actual 
layer. In this project the research question and the working questions are explored from 
several angles, which ought to reveal some general picture of what happens in the 
actual layer. 
Then the analysis and conclusions are drawn. This is done by a theoretical explanation 
of the observations revealed in the actual layer. The theoretical explanation originates 
from the transcendental layer, and the cognitive ‘jump’ from the actual to the 
transcendental layer is done by using the different critically assessed empirical 
tendencies, and either combining some similarities into a coherent hypothesis 
(inductive reasoning) or drawing upon pre-existing macroeconomic theory in order to 
explain the tendencies (abductive reasoning). The hypotheses are abstractions that 
explain the structure and mechanism behind the observations, and thus the hypotheses 
are situated in the transcendental level of reality. 
Several different explanation or hypothesis might therefore originate, and some 
discrimination between the theses needs to be done. They are constantly evaluated 
against other empirical observations or the conclusions already made, by imagining 
how the theses might either be true or false (deductive reasoning). The discrimination 
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is rather done by searching for the hypothesis that has the best tendency to be correct, 
which means that one has to keep a pragmatic view of explanations and an ‘open mind’ 
for how the observations affect the hypotheses. (Lawson 2003: 89-101) 
The retroductive method therefore tries to explain a question about something unique, 
by using several different entry points to create an overall and coherent picture as an 
answer. The method can be said to use a dialectic relationship between the actual and 
the transcendental layer: 
 
“Thus, science, in this framework, is seen to proceed via a continuing spiral of 
discovery and understanding, further discovery and revised, more adequate, 
understanding” ( Lawson 2003: 25). 
It is also important to state that retroduction is more of an implicit process than explicit 
in answering the research question, meaning that many of the conclusions presented in 
the project have been evaluated against other hypothetical explanations, which are not 
presented. Therefore retroduction is in mainly used in this project as a cognitive 
process in answering the research question. 
 
 
How then, does retroduction affect the the way in which we answer the research 
question? The main research question asks what the prospects are of flexicurity in 
rectifying the employment goals of the Lisbon Strategy. Flexicurity is a concept meant 
to encapsulate the apparently success in the Danish labour market, and it can be said to 
reside within the transcendental layer of reality. Flexicurity is a tripartite structure that 
may or may not have the power to reduce unemployment. How the mechanisms of 
flexicurity work is an open question, and we will need to examine the different aspects 
of flexicurity, before an answer can be given. The flexibility and security has to be 
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fully understood, as well as the social aspects that are not mentioned in the tripartite 
flexicurity model, but which might be crucial to its function. When flexicurity is 
sufficiently understood, the next step is to investigate the low unemployment in 
Denmark. It has to be determined if the unemployment really is as low as the statistics 
show, and this is done by analysing the statistical material in debts. Then different 
explanations are evaluated on the basis of the statistics available, and the events that 
occured around 1993 where the unemployment rate started to fall. 
Having analysed how the flexicurity works, and what role it plays in the low 
unemployment, the next step is to use this knowledge to answer the main research 
question in an EU-perspective. 
 
2.3.4. The Epistemology  
The reflections on ontology and the retroductive reasoning have provided the tools to 
produce knowledge within the critical realistic tradition. What is important to 
emphasize in this context, is that knowledge is perceived as being a social product, 
which is created by developing existing knowledge (Lawson1997: 25). The key to why 
knowledge is considered to be a social product is in the process of generating 
hypotheses. Critical realism does not consider the hypotheses as something that 
spontaneously pops up when one probes an unexplained event. Rather it is a cognitive 
process of transforming pre-existing knowledge material into new concepts and 
knowledge (Lawson 1997: 25). The consequence is that the hypothesis created in the 
retroductive reasoning is not only dependent upon the event that it tries to explain but 
also on the knowledge of the scientist who conceives it. This insight makes it inevitable 
that the knowledge is embedded in the social and historical context of which it is 
created. Conducting research is inevitably connected to obtaining knowledge about 
underlying mechanism creating the event and objects of the research. It is important to 
be aware, that the invisible nature of the mechanism hidden in the transcendent level, 
attach some degree of uncertainty, to the conclusions of the project. The 
acknowledgement of the economic system as being open and changeable, places the 
critical realistic approach under an important limiting condition- it is impossible to 
provide certain or “true” knowledge. The world is rather characterised by uncertainty, 
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and therefore attempts to predict future events and create universal laws about 
macroeconomic mechanism are useless. Thus the objective of the critical science is to 
seek “Good reasons to believe” (Jespersen 2:160). Good reasons to believe are an 
ambiguous, but nonetheless useful guideline to the epistemology. Scientific knowledge 
is something that ought to be accepted through a critical scrutiny conducted in an open 
and systematic way. Criticism shows if there are good reasons to believe the 
conclusions.2 
It is therefore important to underline, that the scope of this project is not to predict the 
future development of the Danish labour market neither to predict what happens if 
other EU countries adopt features of the Danish flexicurity model. The project aims at 
creating an understanding of the structures and institutions creating the low 
unemployment in Denmark, to discover the capacities of the concept. This will enable 
us, to discuss the concept against the goals and capacities of the Lisbon Strategy, to 
generate knowledge of Flexicurity’s ability to cope with the unemployment problems 
of the EMU-zone. 
 
2.3.5. Founded in Post Keynesianism 
Following the thought that the methodology of the project has to be as transparent as 
possible the foundation has to be spelled out. The research is founded in the economic 
school of the Post Keynesians, which stresses the importance of methodological 
reflections and the significance of the uncertainty inherent in human choices and 
economic forecasts (Lawson 2003: 170). In relations to critical realism the Post 
Keynesian school is an appropriate macroeconomic approach as it rejects the neo-
classical mathematical deductive model, where the agent is assumed to be rational and 
to have complete information., and thus they do not take uncertainty into account 
Keynes wrote that by uncertainty he did: “Not mean merely to distinguish what is 
known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in 
                                                 
2 It can thereby be said that truth is laid in the scientific community. An argument that has been stressed 
by Roy Bhaskar, the principal philosophical contributor to critical realism, at a seminar held on RUC the 
26/04/2005. He was asked what kind of methodological norms could be used in a research. He answered 
that methodology in it self could not produce certain results, but that other scientist had to accept them in 
an open and critical assessment, thereby utilizing the greatest asset in science, the systematic self-
criticism.  
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this sense to uncertainty … The sense in which I am using the term is that … there is no 
scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not 
know.” (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 464) This uncertainty has several consequences: First 
of all it is an analytical tool, since an uncertain environment affects the behaviour of 
the agents, as was seen in the explanation in the research area of the golden triangle of 
flexicurity. Furthermore uncertainty exists because of the ‘open’ ontology. The 
argument is that social structures are used and reproduced by knowledgeable and 
conscience agents, whose actions are purpose oriented. The agents, however, are not 
conscience about all the consequences of their actions, there rationality is bound, and 
they will inevitable produce unintended consequences, which might over time change 
the entire structure. (Andersen et al. 2003: 416-423).  
Due to the existence of bound rationality, the ontology has to be kept ‘open’ when it 
comes to determining if the structure will repeat itself, since it might have changed. 
This means that there is an inevitable uncertainty essential to the structures and in the 
social processes in both the past, present and future developments (Jespersen 1 2005: 
13). This means that the uncertainty also has an epistemological consequence.  
 
The aim of the project is not to predict future development of flexicurity or the 
consequences of implementing it in the EMU-zone, but rather to analyse the concept 
from a critical perspective pervading the project where both uncertainty and the 
Keynesian effective demand, plays and important part. Uncertainty is an inevitable 
element in analysing the nexus of flexibility and security, which make up flexicurity. 
Furthermore uncertainty will also be reflected in the critics directed towards the ability 
of The Lisbon Strategy to reach the employment goals. Hence the post Keynesian as 
well as the critical realistic approach is imbedded in the arguments made throughout 
the project.   
 
2.4. Delimitation 
The research question asked, reflect a broad research area consisting both of the Danish 
and European labour market, and therefore some delimitations are needed. 
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Flexicurity is a concept that is also used to describe other labour market systems in 
other countries, especially the Netherlands. However this project mainly aims at 
uncovering the capacities of the Danish concept, which means that other flexicurity 
systems are left out, when analysing the Lisbon Strategy. 
In relation to flexicurity, different factors are said to accomplice the functionality of the 
concept, such as the size of the firms in Denmark. The argument is that small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs), where the entry barriers are lower than in larger 
companies, compose the landscape of the Danish labour market. It would be an 
interesting supplement to the project to go deeper into the functionalities at firm level. 
But due to the macro perspective chosen in this project, reaches of this micro 
perspective are left out.  
 
When flexibility is analysed we leave out geographical flexibility. Though 
geographical flexibly does have an affect on how adaptable a national economy is, it is 
not analysed because it is by far determined by cultural factors and very hard to 
change, and therefore irrelevant in a context of reforms. 
As explained in the research areas above, the problems of coping with unemployment 
are more pronounced in Member States, which have lost sovereignty in applying 
macroeconomic instruments. Therefore we find it most relevant to focus the analysis of 
the European context on Member States forming part of the Euro-zone. It has to be 
highlighted, that no profound analysis of the individual Euro-zone countries will be 
conducted. The European level will rather be analysed through statistical key 
indicators, provided by OECD and EURO-stat. 
 
In relation to the Lisbon Strategy it is furthermore important to underline, that it is only 
the goals concerning employment, which is taken into consideration. Goals regarding 
education, technology and innovation could be of great relevance to the research 
question asked, but due to the time frame of the project, other interesting aspects of the 
Lisbon Strategy will be left out. 
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2.5. Theoretical sources 
Interdisciplinary is important, if an adequate analysis of flexicurity is to be conducted. 
Flexicurity combines economic and social aspects of the labour market wherefore 
theories of both economic and a social scientific nature are applied. 
 
In relation to economic theory, the project contains two different theoretical 
approaches, taking form of neoclassical/monetarist theory, including the classical 
labour market theory and Post Keynesian theory. The two poles in economic thinking 
are used as the basis of the theoretical discussions.  
The theoretical choice should be seen in relation to the methodology chosen in the 
project. The retroduction applied in the project requires that the events observed 
empirically are explained and analysed in the light of theoretical ideas and abstractions. 
The chosen theoretical approaches serve the purpose of explaining different 
perceptions on the functionality of the main concepts flexibility and unemployment.  
The Post Keynesian approach constitutes the foundational theory, since the critique 
directed at the flexicurity is grounded in effective demand and uncertainty, which are 
the essential concepts in the Post Keynesian theory. The fact that the Post Keynesian 
approach possesses a central role in the project can be explained by referring to the 
choice of methodology. The critical realism stresses the importance of investigating the 
economy as a whole, which is an ambition that can be traced back to Keynes original 
search for a methodology capable of capturing macroeconomic instability. Like 
Keynes, the critical realism rejects the idea, that equilibrium models can provide an 
exhaustive explanation of macroeconomic events on its own. In the framework of both 
theories equilibrium models are reduced to analytic instruments, incapable of dealing 
with unpredictable events in the economy i.e. the uncertainty.   
 
The neoclassical/monetarist approach is chosen because European economical 
institutions and policies are based on monetarist ideas and arguments (Amorose 2003: 
38).  The monetarist approach is thus important in explaining the macro economic 
frame, within which the Lisbon Strategy is to be fulfilled. The monetarist theory is thus 
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mainly used in the part of the project regarding flexicurity’s ability to cope with the 
rising unemployment problems in the EMU zone. 
Furthermore the Stability and Growth Pact is described and discussed using the Paul de 
Grauwe. He does have a New Keynesian perspective, but his arguments are used as 
pragmatic as possible. 
 
The project aims at obtaining a profound understanding of flexicurity, and therefore as 
explained in the epistemology it is important to understand the context. Therefore the 
institution in the Danish labour market are of interest to us. They will be described and 
explained through the introduction of theories on institutionalism and negotiated 
economy. The Danish labour market cannot be seen as an isolated policy area, since the 
conditions of the labour market, are influenced by factors like social benefits, early 
retirement, industrial conditions, the Lisbon Strategy, and the European integrations 
limiting effects on the use of macro economic instruments etc. The labour market has 
become interlinked with other policy areas such as social policy, industrial policy, 
educational policy and EU policies through time (Kongshøj 1999: 66-67). Theories of 
negotiated economy are able to capture these changes and provide an explanation of 
how the Danish labour market institutions are functioning within an interlinked 
generalised system of negations. Theories on negotiated economy, as described by 
Ove.K. Pedersen and Klaus Nielsen will be applied.  
 
To define the labour market institution, negotiated economy will be explained in terms 
of sociological institutionalism described by March and Olsen. The institutionalism 
provides an understanding of the political processes and mechanisms through which 
institutions and policies are created and developed.  
The choice of introducing negotiated economy and institutionalism is related to the 
methodology. Critical realism favours interdisciplinary explanations of the landscape 
analysed and the two theories provide arguments based on social science as supplement 
to the economic theories.  
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2.6. Empirical sources 
The choice and the processing of empirical data should always draw the attention of the 
careful researcher, since the empirical sources are determining, which conclusions the 
project is able to compose. The project concerns the investigation of a macro economic 
landscape consisting of the Danish version of flexicurity. But the concept is also passed 
on to a broader context consisting of the Lisbon Strategy, since the project focuses on 
the possibilities of flexicurity rectifying the unemployment problems in the EMU zone. 
This task requires an investigation of macro economic events and tendencies, which 
can partly be observed through statistical data. Both processed and unprocessed 
statistical data are therefore found to be the adequate empirical basis of the project. The 
data takes form of scientific reports, official EU documents concerning the Lisbon 
Strategy and both nationally and internationally collected statistical data, which will be 
provided by Statistics Denmark, EUROSTAT and OECD. The data applied is thus 
collected and processed by international standards. But since statistics can only partly 
describe the reality, one should be aware of the problems inherent in applying 
statistical sources. 
 
In relation to the flexicurity both processed and unprocessed data is applied to give a 
profound description of the concept and to analyses the capacity of flexicurity to cope 
with unemployment, in a Danish context. Processed data is used to introduce the 
concept, since the data serves the purpose of highlighting the points made by labour 
market scientist Per Kongshøj Madsen and FAOs, in conceptualising flexicurity. 
Processed OECD statistics elaborated by Per Kongshøj Madsen are applied, when 
flexicurity is introduced, in order to illuminate the difference between Denmark and the 
EU Member States. Furthermore references will be made to these statistics, when the 
Lisbon strategy is discussed. Processed OECD data, can reduce the risk of producing 
misleading results, when comparing parameters like social protection and 
unemployment rates across/between the EU countries. On the other hand, one should 
always keep in mind that processed data is selected and processed by certain criteria, 
wherefore it cannot be perceived as an objective illustration of reality. 
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Unprocessed statistical data is applied in relation to the analysis of the 1994 reform. 
The coexistence of low inflation and low unemployment in Denmark since 1993, is 
often perceived as being the result of the labour market reform made in 19943. The 
analysis serves the purpose of uncovering the impressive results by analysing 
unprocessed data concerning unemployment rate, employments rates, interest rate 
developments and balance of payments, provided by Statistics Denmark.    
The advantage of using Statistics Denmark in relation to unemployment statistics is 
that the data collected is based on administrative data, from CPR registers, social 
registers, tax offices etc, given to the public authorities (Fisker 2000: 26). This provides 
the data with a high validity and respondent rate, because the data is submitted 
administrative control and because falsification of data is punishable by law. (Fisker 
2000: 27). But the researcher has to keep in mind, that the data collected, is collected 
for the purpose of administration rather than research. Thus applying these data require, 
reflections on, whether correct measures are used to explain the investigated concept as 
well as reflections on which conclusions can be drawn from the empirical basis. In 
relation to unemployment statistics, it is important to be aware of groups not 
represented in registered unemployment4 such as activated persons, early retirement 
schemes, non-insured persons5 and persons not eligible for social security etc. These 
groups need to be treated carefully when observing the Danish labour market, because 
change of status of these persons can influence the unemployment rate. In other words, 
the numbers of registered unemployment are subject to changes in the labour market 
policy and the creation and abandonment of policy measures. The above-mentioned 
groups will therefore be taken into consideration, when analysing the effect of the 1994 
reform. 
 
                                                 
3 The 1994 reform is a label for a collection of a number of reforms made in the early 90s. Further 
explanation will follow below.  
4Registered unemployment is measured as the amount of registered unemployed as a share of the work 
force.  
5 Registration at the labour market office is a precondition for receiving unemployment benefits, for 
insured persons. Uninsured persons are also encouraged to register at the labour market office, though 
some under registration might occur in this case (Kongshøj 1999: 18) 
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The discussion of the Lisbon strategy in relation to the Danish flexicurity system 
requires internationally comparable statistics, in order to identify different tendencies 
among the Member States. As supplement to the above mentioned processed data, 
unprocessed data will be applied in order to illuminated different tendencies. The 
sources of the data applied are Statistical Annex of European Economy spring 2006, 
The European Commission and European Central Banc. 
 
In the project, validity of the measures applied as well as the conclusions drawn upon 
them will take form of ongoing reflections process throughout the project.  
 
2.7. Validity and generalisation of the conclusions made 
The validity and ability to generalise the conclusions made in the project have to be 
reflected in the light of the methodology. The question is what are we actually able to 
conclude within the methodological framework- critical realism.  
As explained in the introduction of critical realism, some uncertainty must be attached 
to the conclusions when applying and open ontology and retroduction. The 
acknowledgement of the complexity and transcendent nature of flexicurity, requires 
that the researcher should be cautioned in making to clear-cut conclusions, since it is 
impossible to form a complete map, of all the mechanisms in play. The validity of the 
conclusions must therefore be regarded as limited, when validity is understood as the 
extent to which the measures applied are adequate in fully unfolding the object of the 
research. The conclusions made in the project, are dependent of the limitations set up in 
the project as well as the empirical and theoretical choices. The extension to which, the 
conclusions drawn in the project can be generalised or directly applied in a context 
independent of the conditions set up in the project, is therefore limited. 
More dimensions compose the methodology and the research aims at creating constant 
synthesis between the social sciences applied. The result is an explanatory critic 
directed towards the functionality of flexicurity and its ability to cope with the 
unemployment in a broader EU context. 
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2.8. Structure of the project 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
What are the perspectives of flexicurity to secure the employment goals of the Lisbon Strategy? 
Chapter 2: Theory. Introduction of Macroeconomic concept applied in the project which  provide the 
ground for the following hypotheses, guiding the discussions through out the project:  
1. Wage flexibility can lower unemployment 3. Upgrading the worker skills can lower 
structural unemployment. 
2.Activative government fiscal or monetary 
policy can not lower but only increase inflation 
4. Effective demand can lower long- term 
unemployment.  
Chapter 3: 
Definition and analysis of flexicurity. 
Work question 1: Does Flexicurity work?
Sub question: 1.1: How can flexicurity be 
defined in a Danish context? 
-The institutional framework, 
within which flexicurity has been 
developed and is functioning, is 
described through theories on 
negotiated economy, 
institutionalism.  
 
-The Danish Flexicurity system is 
described through a theoretical and 
empirical analysis of flexibility, security 
and active labour market policy. 
 
1.2 Did flexicurity cause the significant 
fall in unemployment in 1994? 
 
- The 1994 reform is described and 
analysed through statistical data, in order 
to uncover the effects of the labour market 
reform on Danish unemployment rates.  
Furthermore statistical indicators of 
effective demand are analysed with the 
purpose of illuminating the effect of the 
concept in relation to the unemployment 
drop in 1993.
Chapter 4: 
Discussion of flexicurity in relation to the 
Lisbon Strategy. 
Work Question 2: Which problems can 
flexicurity solve, in relation to the 
unemployment problems of the EMU- zone? 
-The economic framework, surrounding the 
Lisbon goals strategy is described, in order to 
identify the influence of macro economic 
policies made at EU level. This is further 
reflected in relation to the economic theories.  
-The Lisbon Employment goals are described, 
and criticized for its focus on “ making work 
pay”, and lacking emphasize on security. 
-The Wim Kok report, pointing at Denmark as a 
benchmark for best practice in relation to 
combining flexibility and security is described 
and discussed. The Wim Kok report accentuates 
the importance of security, but due to the 
method of best practise, flexicurity is regarded 
as an instrument, and only slight attention is 
paid to the role of the institutional framework, 
enabling the functionality of flexicurity in 
Denmark.  
- Post-Keynesian critics: The economic 
framework of the EMU-zone is criticised for its 
focus on supply side. Effective demand is 
analysed and found to be an appropriate 
explanation of differences in employment 
within the EMU-zone. Demand oriented 
policies are suggested as an efficient alternative 
to the policies conducted, within the EMU-
zone. 
Conclusion: A sum-up is provided to draw up the lines of the project. 
Flexicurity combines flexibility, security and active labour market policy. Its functionality depends 
on the institutional framework and effective demand. The concept is difficult to implement in 
countries bound by the rigidities of the EMU. In an uncertain environment unemployment cannot be 
fought through wage flexibility. Upgrading the workforce is dubious. Effective demand is the most 
certain instrument to lower unemployment 
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3. Theory 
This chapter will present three different economic schools. The first is the neoclassical 
school focusing especially on the labour market and causes of unemployment. This will 
be followed by an introduction to monetarist theory, consisting of critics of the Phillips 
curve and the relationship between the monetary and the real side of the economy. Last 
but not least we introduce Post Keynesian theory. This will consist of the basic 
assumptions distancing them from neoclassical theory; furthermore we will introduce 
the concept of effective demand and the Phillips curve. At the end of this chapter there 
will be an operationalization of the theories, as well as a discussion of how 
unemployment can be perceived within the context the theories and the chosen Post 
Keynesian approach to macroeconomics.  
 
3.1. The neo classics6 
The neo classical model holds that it is possible to separate the two factors “real and 
monetary” in the economic system. By this they try to show that provided price and 
wages are both flexible, the quantity of money in the system will serve merely to 
determine the absolute price and wage level, and leave the real situation unaffected. 
(Snowdon & Vane 2005: 38) 
In the neo classical model it is assumed that all economic agents are rational and aim to 
maximize their profits or utility. All markets are perfectly competitive, so that agents 
decide how much to sell and buy on the basis of a given set of prices which are 
perfectly flexible. All agents have perfect knowledge of market conditions and prices, 
and they can, if not predict the future, then calculate the probability of different 
outcomes. (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 38) 
By these assumptions it follows that the economy is always seeking towards general 
equilibrium, and therefore does not need political measures to stabilise it. 
 
                                                 
6 We do not separate between macroeconomic schools of pre-Keynes ’old-neo classics’ such as Walras, 
and the post-Keynes ‘neo classics’ such as Lucas. But it is especially the pre-Keynes ’old-neo classic’ 
school that is referred to. 
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Now we will look at the Employment and Output determination. A key component is 
the short-run production function which expresses the maximum amount of output that 
a firm can produce from any given amounts of factor inputs. The production function 
can be written as follows: 
 
Y=AF(K,L)  see Figure 6 
 
Where Y = GDP, K = capital, L = labour, A = an index of total factor productivity and 
F = a function which relates real output to the inputs of K and L. 
 
It is important to note that for any given values of A and K, there will be a positive 
correlation between L and Y. Furthermore the production function exhibits diminishing 
returns to the variable input, labour. This is also illustrated in Figure 6, which shows 
the marginal product of labour (MPL) measured by ΔY/ΔL, for every new labour 
employed there is less and less output. If K or A is augmented, e.g. by a technological 
progress, the production function shifts upwards as well. The marginal product of 
labour shows the same result by a shift upwards in the demand curve meaning that the 
same labour can now produce more. 
(Snowdon & Vane 2005: 39) 
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Figure 6. The aggregate production function and the marginal product of labour 
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We now look at the neo classics model of the labour market. This is seen as the 
relationship between demand and supply of labour.  
The well known condition for profit maximation is that a firm should set its marginal 
revenue MR equal to the marginal costs MC to ensure profit maximizing.  
This means that for a perfectly competitive firm price P will equal MR and MC.  
If a company chooses to hire more labour, it will have to pay more wages W and the 
cost of hiring new labour will be W ΔL. The revenue of hiring extra labour will be the 
extra output produced ΔQ times the price of the company’s product P. This will 
generate revenue of P ΔQ. It is then profitable for a company to hire more labour as 
long as W ΔL < P ΔQ. 
To maximize profits requires satisfaction of the following condition: W ΔL = P ΔQ 
Which is equivalent to ΔQ/ ΔL = W/P. 
Since ΔQ/ ΔL is the marginal product of labour MPL, a given company should hire 
labour until the marginal product of labour equals the real wage. 
ΔQ/ ΔL = W/P, we can write this relationship as MC = W/MPL, furthermore this can 
be written as P = W/MPL = MC. 
Because MPL is a declining function of the amount of labour employed, the MPL 
curve will have a negatively sloped curve (see Figure 6). Since we have shown that 
profits will be maximized when MPL = W/P, the MPL curve will be identical to the 
companies demand curve for labour: DL = DL (W/P) 
The companies demand for labour will be an inverse function of the real wage. The 
lower the real wage, the more labour will be profitably hired. 
(Snowdon & Vane 2005: 40-42) 
 
On the demand side of labour, it is assumed that households will aim to maximize their 
utility. The market supply S of labour is therefore a positive function of the real wage 
rate and is given by SL = SL (W/P) The decisive point here is the relationship in the 
populations preferences between work and leisure time. There will be a positive effect 
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on work time if wage increases. Equilibrium is found in the crossing point between 
demand and supply of labour.( see figure 7) In the neo classical model equilibrium 
represents full employment. There is therefore no such thing as involuntary 
unemployment. (Snowdon& Vane 2005: 42-44) 
 
Figure 7. Output and employment determination in the classical model 
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3.1.1. Unemployment 
If there is no such thing as involuntary unemployment, why does unemployment exist, 
and can this not be lowered by a fall in real wages. Here we will make a short 
presentation of the neoclassical explanation of this phenomenon. 
 
Long-run structural unemployment 
There are different forms of unemployment that explain structural unemployment. 
The first is when people abuse the social benefit system, these people may be 
registered as unemployed but will not be looking for jobs, as they only want to collect 
unemployment benefits. 
The second is frictional unemployment, this may happen when people have found a 
job, but have not yet started in it. Another reason for this phenomena is that people are 
in between jobs because some firms close and others are opening. 
The third is search unemployment, this happens when people turning down job offers 
because they are holding out for a better-paid job. Generous unemployment benefits 
keep the cost side down when searching for a job, and therefore lower benefits will 
tend to reduce search unemployment. This is one example of a structural policy that 
could be used to lower structural unemployment. 
The fourth example is efficiency wages. Productivity may depend positively on real 
wages, then the traditional labour demand curve disappears. Firms may then chose a 
combination of labour and real wage inside the labour supply curve. This results in 
unemployment without falling wages. 
The last example of unemployment without falling wages is the role of trade unions. 
The trade union sets the wage rate above the natural equilibrium and therefore the 
labour market doesn’t work competitively, but takes on aspects of a monopoly market, 
thus increasing the supply of labour while decreasing the demand. (Sørensen 2005: 
331-33)  
All in all there can be said to be two neoclassical laws derived from structural 
unemployment.  
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-There is no upwards or downwards trend in the rate of unemployment in the long run. 
-When rates of unemployment are at their lowest, there is still a substantial amount of 
unemployment. This type of unemployment will not have a downward pressure on real 
wages. (Sørensen 2005: 327) 
An indicator of structural unemployment is the Beveridge curve. The Beveridge curve 
is the correlation between vacant jobs and unemployment. The further northeast the 
curve is situated, the more severe are the problems of mismatch. If workers and jobs 
have difficulties finding each other this can create greater unemployment. (Sørensen 
2005: 318-19) 
 
In any given period = t: 
Unemployment rate = Total 
number of Unemployed / Total 
Labour force  
?  
ut = Ut / Lt 
 
Job vacancy rate = Number of 
vacant jobs / total number of 
jobs offered by employers 
? 
vt = Vt / Jt 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8 - The Beveridge Curve 
(Wikipedia.org 15/05/06) 
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3.2. Monetarism7 
The orthodox monetarist school is a development of the classical quantity theory 
(QTM) which we will not go deeper into, but simply state the assessments derived 
from it. This will prepare us for an introduction to the expectation augmented Phillips 
curve. The operationalization of this theory will be an analysis of the macroeconomic 
policy led by the ECB in the Euro area, as this is very inspired from monetarist theory.  
 
There are five basic assessments of the monetarist theory: 
1. Changes in the money stock are predominant factor explaining changes in 
money income 
2. In the face of a stable demand for money, most of the observed instability in the 
economy could be attributed to fluctuations in the money supply induced by 
monetary authorities. 
3. The authorities can control the money supply if they choose to do so and when 
that control is exercised the path of money income will be different from a 
situation where the money supply is endogenous. 
4. The lag between changes in the money stock and changes in money income is 
long and variable, so that attempts to use discretionary monetary policy to fine-
tune the economy could turn out to be destabilizing 
5. The money supply should be allowed to grow at a fixed rate in line with the 
underlying growth of output to ensure long-term price stability (Snowdon & 
Vane 2005: 173) 
 
3.2.1. The expectation augmented Phillips curve 
The notion of a stable relationship between inflation and unemployment is challenged 
by the monetarists. The problem with the original specification of the Phillips curve is 
that the rate of change in money wages is determined quite independently of the rate of 
                                                 
7 Monetarism and the neo classical school are different, but not always separable schools. It depends on 
the subject whether or not they are similar or not. However they use the same basic rational actor 
assumption and mathematical deductive method. In the eyes of the critical realist they are therefore so 
similar that they constitute a common standing in macroeconomics, and therefore this project won’t 
dwell too much on their independent differences. 
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inflation. This in turn implies that workers are irrational and suffer from complete 
money illusion, in that they base their labour supply decisions on the level of money 
wages quite independently of what is happening to prices. 
Although money wages are set in negotiations, both employers and employees are 
interested in real, not money, wages. Since wage bargains are negotiated for discrete 
time periods, what affects the anticipated real wage is the rate of inflation expected to 
exist throughout the period of the contract. Monetarists argue that the Phillips curve 
should be set in terms of the rate of change in real wages. They therefore augment the 
basic Phillips curve with the anticipated or expected rate of inflation as an additional 
variable determining the rate of change of money wages. The expectations-augmented 
Phillips curve can be expressed as W = f(U) + Pe (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 174-76) 
This means that instead of one Phillips curve there will be a family of Phillips curves, 
each associated with a different expected rate of inflation. 
Excess demand in goods and labour markets would result in upward pressure on prices 
and money wages. Workers would misinterpret their money wage increase and supply 
more labour; that is, they would suffer from temporary money illusion. Real wages 
would, however, actually fall and, as firms demanded more labour, unemployment 
would fall, with money wages rising. Although their money wages had risen, their real 
wages would have fallen, and they would press for increased money wages, shifting the 
short-run Phillips curve upwards. Money wages would rise at a rate of W1 plus the 
expected rate of inflation. Firms would lay of workers as real wages rose and 
unemployment increased until real wages were restored to original level.  
This means that once the actual rate of inflation is completely anticipated, meaning that 
there is no illusion of a wealth increase, there will be no long-run trade of between 
unemployment and wage inflation. It follows that a long-run vertical Phillips curve is 
obtained at the natural rate of unemployment. (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 175-77) 
(See figure 9) 
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Figure 9. The expectations-augmented Phillips curve 
 
3.3. Post Keynesian economics 
Neo classical economists as well as monetarists are convinced that flexibility is the best 
cure for high unemployment. This is an argumentation based on the assumption that the 
economy is always striving towards equilibrium therefore will find its way back to 
natural unemployment. 
Any diversion from this is because of regulations and institutions hindering market 
forces from working, and the solution is therefore deregulation and institutional reform. 
This is entirely based on a supply side view. 
 
In developing his theory Keynes attempted to show that macroeconomic equilibrium is 
consistent with involuntary unemployment. He raised two interrelated issues, first the 
controversy over the self-equilibrating properties of the economy and second, the role 
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for interventionist government policies. He introduces the principle of effective 
demand, together with the equilibrating role of changes in output rather than prices. 
The principle of effective demand states that in a closed economy with spare capacity 
the level of output and hence employment is determined by aggregate planned 
expenditure, which consists of two components, consumption expenditure from 
households C and investment expenditure from firms I. (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 57-
58) 
In neo classical theory, consumption, savings and investments are all functions of the 
interest rate. (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 47-49) In Keynes model, consumption 
expenditure is endogenous and depending on income rather than interest rate. For him 
the rate of interest was the reward for parting with liquidity or not hoarding for a 
specified period. In a world characterized by uncertainty there will always be a 
speculative motive to hold cash in preference to other financial assets. By introducing 
the speculative motive into the money demand function, Keynes made the rate of 
interest dependent on the state of confidence as well as the money supply. Since there 
was a dependence of aggregate output and employment on aggregate expenditure 
(effective demand, C+I) this created the potential for instability, since investment 
expenditure is typically owing to the influence of business expectations relating to an 
uncertain future. An uncertain future also creates the desire for liquidity, so that 
variations in the demand for money as well as changes in the money supply can 
influence output and employment.  Therefore in Keynes model the classical 
proposition, that the quantity of money is neutral, was rejected.  
Schematically presented this look like this: 
Keynes: income = production = demand 
Neo classics: Capital + labour + technology => production => final demand 
(Jespersen 2000: 37) 
Four central beliefs can be listed:  
1. The economy is inherently unstable and is subject to erratic shocks. These 
shocks are attributed primarily to changes in the marginal efficiency of 
investment following a change in the state of business confidence. 
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2. Left to its own devices the economy can take a long time to return to full 
employment after being subjected to some disturbance; that is, the economy is 
not rapidly self-equilibrating. 
3. The aggregate level of output and employment is essentially determined by 
aggregate demand and the authorities can intervene to influence the level of 
aggregate “effective” demand to ensure a more rapid return to full employment. 
4. In the conduct of a stabilization policy, fiscal, as opposed to monetary policy, is 
generally preferred as the effects of fiscal policy measures are considered to be 
more direct, predictable and faster acting on aggregate demand than those of 
monetary policy. (Snowdon 2005: 102) 
 
  
We will explain the correlation between demand and unemployment in the Keynesian 
theory.  
Effective demand => production => employment. 
In our simple model we only focus on the private side of the economy and we make the 
assumption that it is a closed economy, so we leave out export and import.  
Household income consists of Y=C+S, where Y is income, C consumption and S 
savings. 
The consumption function is given by the propensity of the income, c spent on private 
consumption. The consumption function can be written as follows C = C0 +c * Y where 
C0 is the autonomous consumption. This is illustrated below. 
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Figure 10. The Consumption function 
 
GDP = Y  
            
Figure 11. The supply function 
Companies have two roles. First they produce (GDP) the expected demand. This will 
create income(Y). See the figure above. 
Besides producing goods, companies also make real investments. These are to be added 
to private consumption: D = C + I  
D is the total demand, C consumption and I investments     
 
We then look at companies demand for labour. 
This is seen with a rise in production (GDP) creating a rise in demand for labour. 
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Figure 12. The short-term production function 
This makes us able to make the correlation between employment and aggregate 
demand. Employment in the private sector is therefore a variable controlled by private 
consumption and real investment. 
 
Figure 13. Income and employment model 
 (Jespersen 2000: 44) 
The intersection where production equals demand will create a specific demand for 
labour. 
Furthermore we can ad government expenditure to this model. 
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(Snowdon & Vane 2005: 64) 
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3.3.1. Inflation and unemployment (the Phillips curve) 
The Phillips curve is concerned with the correlation between employment and inflation. 
The curve is originally an empirical study carried out by A.W. Phillips derived from 
statistical material between 1861-1913 and 1948-57 in the UK. 
Here Phillips found a remarkable correlation between these two periods, given by 
equation W = -0.9 + 9.638(U)-1.394 
Even though this was an empirical investigation Phillips tried to explain it theoretically 
as follows: 
“When the demand for a commodity or service is high relative to the supply of it we 
expect the price to rise, the rate of rise being greater the greater the excess demand. 
Conversely, when the demand is low relative to the supply we expect the price to fall, 
the rate of fall being greater the greater the deficiency of demand. It seems plausible 
that this principle should operate as one of the factors determining the rate of change 
of money wage rates” (Snowdon 2005: 136) 
 
Figur 14. The Phillips curve 
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One of the main reasons why the Phillips curve was quickly adopted by Keynesians 
was that it seemed to provide an explanation of inflation which was missing in the then 
prevailing macroeconomic model. 
Up to full employment money wages were assumed to be fixed and unresponsive to 
changes in aggregate demand. Only when full employment was reached would changes 
in aggregate demand affect the price level. The Phillips curve allowed the Keynesian 
theory of output and employment determination to be linked to a theory of wage and 
price inflation (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 142) 
 
3.3.2. The productivity expanded Phillips curve  
This states that if wages rise in the same rate as productivity, then profits and prices 
will remain unchanged. Therefore productivity expectations play a central role in the 
productivity expanded Phillips curve. The negotiation of employers and employees will 
then be influenced by the current unemployment rate. If unemployment is low, then 
workers will demand wages that are higher than the expected productivity increase, and 
visa-versa. The level where income distribution in negotiations between employers and 
employees is left unchanged is called the neutral unemployment and is illustrated on 
figure 14. by Apct0. 
 
3.3.3. Cyclical unemployment 
Unemployment that occurs due to a lack of effective demand is called cyclical 
unemployment. It is a kind of unemployment, which happens when an economy is in 
recession. In such a case the unemployed workers cannot get a job because the number 
of unemployed exceeds the number of job vacancies. So even if all the jobs were taken, 
there would still be unemployment. In an economic downturn, the enterprises have a 
hard time selling their goods and services, because the consumers are poorer than they 
would normally be, i.e. lack demand, mainly because more people are unemployed. On 
the other hand the unemployed workers don’t have a job because the firms do not earn 
enough profit to employ the,. one affects the other and, in a worse case scenario a 
vicious circle will worsen the recession.  
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Instead of lowering the wages, as the neo classics would recommend, the enterprises 
needs someone to sell their goods and services to, in order to break the vicious circle. 
The necessary demand could either be come from:  
- The households or unattached individuals, i.e. the private consumption 
expenditures (C)  
- Other businesses, who invest and spend there profits in goods or services 
produced by domestic suppliers, i.e. the gross private domestic investments, 
termed (I). 
- The government’s consumption and investment in domestic goods and services, 
i.e. gross government consumption (G)  
- The flows of demand in and out of the country represented by the rest of the 
worlds demand for goods and services minus the imported goods and services, 
i.e. net export,  (E-Im)  
(Jespersen 2004: 121) 
An equation for thereafter the four factors of demand could describe the combined 
demand, dubbed aggregate demand (Y): 
Y = C + I + G + (E-Im)  
A positive increase in any of four factors of demand should, because of the 
interrelation between supply and demand, lower the unemployment, since the firm 
would now be able to make the profit needed to hire the unemployed. It is important to 
state that an increase in the aggregate demand function will only lead to an increase in 
employment if the enterprises expect the increased demand to be sustained. The 
enterprises determine their future production in a given future period based on there 
expectations on the sales of their goods and services. If in a given period, there has 
been an increase in the demand for the firms goods and services, due to an increase in 
the aggregate demand function, the firms can increase their production in the next 
period to utilize the extra potential profit. Employing new workers would increase the 
production (Jespersen 2004: 62), but if the enterprises are uncertain if the increased 
demand will continue, it might be more reasonable not to increase the production to 
much, as they might end up with an oversupply. An example would be that G has 
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increased due to a loosening of the fiscal policy, and the enterprises are uncertain 
whether or not the government will sustain the policy. 
 
3.3.4. Structural unemployment8 interpreted in an effective demand perspective 
Structural unemployment is a kind of unemployment that may arise because the 
qualifications of the unemployed workers doe not fit with the skills that are needed for 
the jobs available at the labour market. In such a case there may be a high number of 
job vacancies, as well as high unemployment. (Jespersen 2004:120). If structural 
unemployment arises, the workers who don’t have the skills demanded by the labour 
market will be involuntarily unemployed, whereas those who have the skills can only 
be voluntarily unemployed, which means that full employment exists in these labour 
sectors.  
The structural unemployment can have risen due to a sustained high cyclic 
unemployment. The thesis postulates that workers who have been unemployed for a 
long time will be less skilled than if they had stayed unemployed, and they might even 
have lost some of the productivity they possessed when they were employed, since they 
have not stimulated their skills for a long time., thus making it harder to reenter the 
labour market If this is a general tendency in the economy, the rise in effective demand 
could not simply be transferred into employment. Hence cyclic unemployment has 
changed into structural unemployment. 
The effect that a cyclic unemployment, i.e. a lack of effective demand affects structural 
unemployment, i.e. human capital, is termed hysteresis. Hysteresis is a concept that 
describes a system that reacts slowly to the force applied to it, and doesn’t return to its 
original state once the force is removed, i.e. a system that is dependant upon its recent 
history (Wikipedia 27-04-2006). So when effective demand and cyclic unemployment 
might change very rapidly in a flexible labour market, the hysteresis effect means that 
                                                 
8 Structural unemployment is often a concept that is used to say that minimum wages are too high or that 
labour unions are too powerful. Here the concept refers to unemployment due to differences in human 
capital. 
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structural unemployment is slow to change, since human capital takes time to acquire 
and time to loose.9 (Snowdon & Vane 2005: 401-408). 
If structural unemployment is the problem it cannot simply be solved by a 
straightforward demand side stimulus, as in the case of cyclic unemployment. An 
increase in the effective demand might even be very harmful if the additional demand 
does not enhance the sectors where the unemployed could be used, but instead more 
demand is made upon the goods and services produced by the sectors that already are 
running at its maximum. In such a case the business sector would most likely raise the 
prices of the demanded goods and services, and increase the wages of the employees, 
which would result in both price- and wage inflation, without any trade-off in 
employment. This situation, where the firms try to increase production of there sector, 
is called a bottleneck. The situation is highly beneficial to the employed workers, who 
have a high bargaining power when it comes to wage negotiations, since the employed 
worker knows that it will be very costly for the firm if he leaves for a competing firm, 
who would gladly offer him a higher salary. As a result the increased profit earned by 
the higher prices will to a large extend go to the employed.  
Bottlenecks can nevertheless, produce a positive social externality if the danger of 
inflation is kept under a watchful eye. If the firms want to decrease the bargaining 
power of the workers and increase there production, they can try to be creative in their 
search. A possibility is to try to utilize the human capital that might lie in the 
unemployed people who have given up work or have suffered from a hysteresis effect. 
The productivity of such people is obviously not high since their low productivity is the 
reason why they wouldn’t normally be in demand. The firms can try to adapt and 
finding ways to incorporate the less well educated and more problematic workers, in 
the firm an there by increasing the firms productivity (Such as investing in education in 
computers for the worker who has been left behind, and other kinds of vocation 
training). This was what was happened in Denmark in the 60’s, where there was an 
overall low unemployment under 2%, and therefore made it in the interest of the firms 
to be more flexible in employing workers (Politiken 22-03-2006).  
 
                                                 
9 The concept of hysteresis is borrowed from the New Keynesian school of macro economics, but in this 
case it doesn’t imply that a NAIRU should exist. 
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3.4. Operationalization  
This section provides an operationalization of our theories. As discussed in our 
methodology, retroduction is a mode of inference that is characterised by a dialectical 
correlation between the observed empirical events to the abstract ideas about the ways 
of the world. The theories presented above view the world in two very different ways. 
Neoclassic and monetarist theory view the economy as a system were there is full 
information and people act rationally on a predictable future. Post Keynesians perceive 
agents as acting on bound rationality. The existence of bound rationality means that 
there is an inevitable uncertainty essential to the structures and the social processes. 
The two different approaches to the economy bring with them very different 
hypotheses. These hypotheses are not answered explicit but transcend the analysis 
helping us in analysing the hidden mechanisms in the economy through the 
retroductive method. 
Four basic hypotheses can be said to be derived from the two approaches. 
-Wage flexibility can lower unemployment. 
-Active government fiscal or monetary policies can not lower unemployment but only 
increase inflation. 
-Upgrading worker skills can lower structural unemployment. 
-Effective demand can lower long term unemployment. 
As it can be seen some of the hypotheses are mutually exclusive, this means that during 
the project we will turn in favour of some of them. This is done by using a retroductive 
analysis of the chosen empirical material.  
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4. Historical overview of the development of the Danish labour 
market 
The integration of the Danish labour market is the outcome of a long historical 
development, in which implementation of different labour market reforms, switching 
political objectives and establishment of different institutions are of great importance. 
 
 The history of the integration of the Danish labour market dates back to the 1890s, 
where the two umbrella organisations Federation of Danish Trade Unions10 and the 
Confederation of Danish Employers´ associations11, won the right to regulate the wage 
and work conditions independently (Pedersen and Nielsen 1998: 86).  
The September compromise, concluded in 1899, played an important part in 
establishing the relationship between the labour market parties. The agreement 
included a mutual recognition of the employers and workers right to set up 
organisations. In addition, the trade unions accepted the employer’s right to hire and 
fire workers, and finally the agreement established rules for strikes and lock-out, used 
by the parties in case of conflicts (Kongshøj 1999: 26). The September compromise has 
thus laid the ground for the industrial relations within the Danish labour market. 
Another important event in the beginning of the 1900, was the law on insurance funds, 
was passed. Thus an unemployment benefit fund established by the trade unions, 
became regulated by law in 1907 (Kongshøj 2006: 26). 
 
In the period from 1910 to 1930 many different private organisations were established 
to negotiated agreements on wage and work conditions (Pedersen and Nielsen 1988: 
86). The labour market negotiating was conducted almost freely until 1934, where rules 
for state interventions in regulation of labour market conflicts were established, along 
                                                 
10 The Federation of Danish Trade Unions, is Lands organisationen I Danmark (LO). In 1899 it 
represented 50,959 members, but in 2004 it counted 18 member organisations which gives a total 
amount of 1.369.198 members. 
(http://www.lo.dk/smcms/Rundt_om_LO/Fakta_og_baggrund/Fakta_om_LO_historie/4126/4127/Index.
htm?ID=4127) 
 
11 The Confederation of Danish employers´ associations is Dansk arbejdsgiverforening (DA), in Danish 
terms. 
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with a consolidation board as a public mediator in labour market conflict. Thus from 
mid-1930, the government and parliament, stated to intervene in the negotiations 
(Kongshøj 1999: 26). 
In 1942, the ministry of labour was established as a separate ministry. 
In 1960s, a revision of the September compromise was conducted, and the social 
partners agreed that suspected unfair dismal could be assessed by a special tribunal 
(Kongshøj 2006:.26). In 1962, the Economic Advisory Council12, consisting of 
economic experts, was established, with the purpose of supervising the Danish 
economy, and generating a common awareness of coordination problems within it 
(Økonomisk råd). The economic council underlined the need for income policy, to co-
ordinate collective wage agreements with overall socio economic objectives (Nielsen 
and Pedersen 1988:88).  
In the mid-1960s, negotiations of wage and work conditions became more centralised. 
Before the ‘60s, negotiations took place mainly at a decentralised and the local trade 
unions had the authority to conclude agreements whereas the central organisations 
were responsible for coordinating the collective agreements. The movement towards 
more centralised steering of the wage formation was one of the first steps taken 
towards a coordinated income policy to control wage growth. Due to the vast number 
of different local labour market organisations, it became more difficult for the 
Federation of Danish Trade Unions to control the wage formation, therefore 
centralisation was needed to establish a more harmonised wage policy( Kongshøj 1999: 
27) 
Another important event taking place in the 1960s was the reform of unemployment 
benefits in 1969. The state undertook responsibility for the extra cost of unemployment 
benefits, which were caused by increase in unemployment, this meant that members of 
unemployment insurance funds could pay a fixed membership contribution, 
independently of the unemployment rate. (Kongshøj 2006:26) 
 
                                                 
12 Økonomisk Råd 
 49
During the 1970s, income policy was used, due to the oil-crises and stagflation in the 
Danish economy. In the 1980s the wage formation retuned to the decentralised system. 
The reason was, that the high level of unemployment and the falling inflation, made 
political steering of the wage formation less necessary, as the large number of 
unemployed kept a natural restraint on wages. The unions bargaining position was 
reduced, and thus also the risk of handing over the power of wage formation. 
(Kongshøj 1999: 27). 
In 1987 a joint declaration was made among the labour market parties, where the 
partners stated, that they would take the overall macro economic performance into 
consideration when negotiating wages. This mend that the negotiated wage increases, 
should be kept below international wage inflation, to improve the competitiveness of 
the Danish industry (Kongshøj 2006: 22) 
 
In the 1990 further decentralisation of the wage formation was established. In 1991 a 
collective agreement for the wage system of unskilled workers was changed. Before 
this wages was negotiated by centralised unions. Now the centralised agreements fixed 
minimum wages, and the major part of wages were negotiated at firm level, in a 
performance-linked system instead. In addition the 1991 agreement introduced work 
conditions and extended the decentralised wage negotiations by including parts of the 
public sector (Kongshøj 1999: 27)  
In 1994 an extensive labour market reform was entering into force, consisting of a 
steering reform, a decentralisation of the labour market policy to regional level, and an 
activation reform, in which upgrading of capacities for both workers and unemployed 
played a crucial part13. The reform also contained a reduction of the period, a person 
could receive passive unemployment benefits, from 4 to 2 years (Kongshøj 1999: 56). 
In 1996, an adjustment of the 1994 reform was made targeting young unemployed, by 
putting an obligation for unemployed under the age of 25 years, to take up, minimum 
18 months of education, after six month of unemployment (Kongshøj 1999: 57)   
 
                                                 
13 The 1994 reform, will be analysed and described in details below. 
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The relationship between the labour market parties has been developed through a long 
process of agreements, conflicts and labour market reform. The labour markets partners 
have manage to establish a system, in which wages and work conditions have been 
decided mainly by the social partners. However the intervention of the state has varied 
through time, depending of the economic situation within the Danish economy. But the 
fact is that due to the long history of negotiations, the labour markets partners have 
succeed in the establishment of a well structured and well functioning negotiation 
system, through which labour market policies and wages are established. To obtain a 
more coherent idea, of the labour market as an institution, focus will be moved toward 
the concept of negotiated economy and meta-theoretical concept from the sociological 
institutionalism.   
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5. Negotiated economy 
As it is evident from the historical introduction above, the Danish labour market is 
characterised by a long process of integration among varies labour market parties. 
Since the 1890s a political culture has developed in Denmark, where the corporations 
and wages earners have become highly organised, and were negotiations have become 
ever more institutionalised. This process has led to a system, where individual market 
agents determine wages, working hours and other work conditions, through organised 
negotiations, at macro, meso and micro level (Pedersen 2005: 3).  
Pedersen argues, that through time, the negotiated economy, which started out with the 
labour market partners, has expanded, to include more private and public actors, and 
more policy areas, such as industrial policy, and structural policy14.  The result is the 
establishment of an environment, where the creation of macro economic policies, are 
made through routine bargaining among government and peak organisations, and 
where decisions are based on consensus. This generalised system of bargaining is the 
negotiated economy and it can be described as follows “in a negotiation based 
economy, decisions are made in a generalised political system of negotiations, where 
the deliberate shaping of preferences and the mutual understanding of socio-economic 
problems put limits to and set targets for multiple arenas of negotiations between 
public and private and centralized as well as decentralized collective actors” (Pedersen 
2005: 3). 
The negotiated economy is a system of governance, in which autonomous actors, in 
both the public and private sector, negotiate liberally, in the sense that the state is a 
partner in the negotiation rather than the decision making authority. The Ministry of 
Finance plays an important role coordinating the negotiations and it is further more in 
charge of the arbitration sanctioning breaches of the agreements (Pedersen 2005: 20). 
What makes negotiated economy different from other types of economies, is the 
combined effort between public and private institutions in coping with problems in the 
national economy “ Whereas both the mixed and market economy are based on a clear 
division of labour between the sovereign state and an autonomous market, the 
negotiated economy entails political and economic processes and relations, that are 
                                                 
14 This will be explained further below. 
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neither strictly public nor private but are situated between public and private 
autonomy” (Pedersen 2005: 2). 
The negotiated economy states, that within the Danish system, both private and public 
organisations have recognised the importance of taking joint action to solve, macro 
economic problems, and by time more policy areas have been integrated into the 
negotiated economy. Hence, what started out, as being a negotiation system between 
the labour market parties, has expanded from isolated negotiations in different policy 
areas, into a generalised system of negotiations, which are embedded in a collective 
understanding of socio economic problems (Pedersen 2005: 23).  
This degree of corporatistic centralisation has some very important effects on the 
labour market. To help us uncover these we will include Calmfors and Driffills theories 
of bargaining structure. Calmfors and Driffill prove that there is a connection between 
real wage growth and the degree of centralization-decentralization in the labour market 
negotiations. They prove that in the extremes there is a larger degree of wage restrains 
then in the intermediate models. The reason for this differs between the two models. In 
the decentralised model wage increases will be restraint by market forces as there are 
no strong labour unions to counter them (Calmfors et alt., 1988: 15). At the other end 
of the spectre unions with a high degree of organisation and centralisation are able to 
recognise broader national interests which will lead to restrains in there demands for 
real wage increases. (Calmfors et alt., 1988: 15) So very centralised models like the 
Danish, will in general experience smaller real wage increases then intermediate 
models (Calmfors et alt., 1988: 15).  This in turn means that enterprises in these 
countries will be more likely to employ a larger number of employees, resulting in an, 
all else equal, higher employment (Calmfors et alt., 1988: 26). Furthermore we mean 
that the ability of centralised systems to appreciate broader national intercedes stretches 
beyond merely wage negotiations but also leads to an easier acceptance of government 
initiatives to ensure a continued high employment as seen with the flexicurity law of 
1994.    
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5.1. Mutual understanding of socio-economic problems: 
The participants in the negotiated economy are tied together by a common 
understanding of socio economic problems and a common interest in solving them. In 
this view the entire economy is seen as a single organism encompassing all private and 
public behaviour.  
(Nielsen & Pedersen 1998: 86). 
The mutual understanding of socio economic problems is created through an ongoing 
conscious process in which the problems are tuned into a rationale i.e. systematically 
structured and coherent discourse on society as such. Thus the mutual understanding of 
socio-economic problems is the result of a process, where economic phenomenon’s are 
being framed and translated into perceptions of individual and common interests 
(Pedersen 2005: 5).  
Both private and public organisations can be identified as participating in the 
articulation of the economic problems, thus contributing to the creation of the mutual 
understanding. Since the 1960s, campaign institutions such as the Economic Advisory 
council, have played a crucial part in articulating the Danish socio economic discourse, 
by communicating the socio-economic conception to the broader public and to create 
focus on particular socio-economic problems, in order to get them on the political 
agenda (Pedersen 2005: 6). The articulation of socio-economic problems creates a 
common corpus of ideas or a common language, which makes the partner able to 
interpret and understand social events and work towards goals and solutions. The 
process of creating the mutual understanding of socio economic problems is a 
discursive process, based on articulation of ideas and interpretation of observed events 
(Pedersen 2005: 4- 5). The socio economic discourse is providing the overall objectives 
for the bargaining taking place within the labour market and the other policy areas 
forming part of the negotiated economy. Since the nature of the mutual understanding 
of socio-economic problems is discursive, then it is also changing over time, and thus 
so is the institutions involved in the negotiated economy.  
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5.2. Institutionalised learning 
Negotiations have become institutionalised, into a system of more generalised 
negotiations, meaning that negotiations has become more organised and policy issues 
have been linked or interlocked. Changing conditions in the Danish economy has 
brought about changes in the negotiated economy, through the process of continuing 
formulation and reformulation of the mutual understanding of socio economic 
problems. According to Pedersen, four important shifts in the discourse have 
contributed to the institutional change. 
 
From mid-1945 until mid-1970s, the Danish economic policy was mainly perceived as 
being a trade off between employment and balanced budgets, and therefore fiscal-, 
wage- and income policy were considered as the main policy instruments, to cope with 
effects of business cycles (Pedersen 2005: 9). Bargaining about working hours and 
working conditions were therefore of great importance in the Danish economy, because 
it was believed, that wage structures and labour market needed to be maintained in 
ways that better facilitated economic growth (Pedersen 2005: 9). This provided the 
labour market organisations Federation of Danish Trade Unions and the Confederation 
of Danish Employers´ associations, with a central role within the Danish economy. In 
addition, the Economic Advisory Council was established in 1962, with the purpose of 
supervising the Danish economy and generates a common awareness of coordination 
problems within it15. 
 
Due to the oil crises in the 1970s and the experience of stagflation, the socio economic 
problems were perceived as structural problems and thus connected to supply side 
factors, from the 1970s unto the 1980s. The socio economic discourse concerned the 
low competitiveness and low level of R&D within the Danish industry16. At the same 
                                                 
15As mentioned above, The Economic Council underlined the need for an income policy to co-ordinate 
collective wage agreements with overall socio economic objectives, and in 1979 wage policy became 
accepted as an economic political instrument to be applied in the long- term redistribution of income 
(Nielsen & Pedersen 1988:88). 
 
16 The labour market partners wanted a stronger industrial policy capable of reorganising the Danish 
industry, while the Federation of Industry demand wage restrains and reduction of public expenditures, 
to gain competitiveness (Pedersen 2005: 25) 
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time, the increasing size of the public sector was of great concern, which brought about 
reform of state administration, introducing private principles and renovation of public 
management (Pedersen 2005: 9). Industrial and technological policies were regarded as 
an important means to create economic growth and to better the competitiveness of the 
Danish industry (Pedersen 2005: 10). The main actors in interpreting the socio 
economic problems and formulating the industrial policy were the Ministry of Industry 
and networks of public and semi public discourse organisations17, industry, organised 
labour and political parties (Pedersen 2005: 12). 
 
From the mid 1980s and 1990s, the socio economic discourse switched towards a focus 
on the Danish systems adaptability to a future European economic integration and 
competitiveness in a globalised economy. Focus was on the future, which resulted in 
future oriented strategy creation rather then finding explanations by looking at the past 
(Pedersen 2005: 23). The Forum of Industrial Development18 was established to push 
industrial restructuring on the agenda. The main focus in this period was to strengthen 
Danish competition in an international environment, encouraging economic growth 
through coordination of industrial development, education and labour market mobility 
(Pedersen 2005: 13).  
 
In the 1990s a structural policy19 was established, on initiatives from Economic 
advisory council and discourse organisations, to cope with the economic problems 
through coordination of industrial policy, labour market policy, employments policy 
and R&D policy (Pedersen 2005: 13). In this period much attention was paid to the 
modernisation of the public sector. Decentralisation of the public sector and focus on 
coordinating policies to cope with economic problems within the Danish economy, 
                                                 
17 Public and semi public organisations are ex universities and R&D development organisations. 
18 Forum of Industrial Development is composed by representatives from firms, institutional investors, 
trade unions and other private organisations as well as social democratic civil servants (Pedersen 2005: 
13) 
19 Structural policy is to be understood as an integrative attempt to cope with the socio economic 
problems “Structural policy is one of a simultaneous and integrated structural adaptation of both the 
public and the private sector. It looks upon reorganising of the public sector as a prerequisite for 
restructuring industry and it looks upon the restructuring of industry as a prerequisite for making 
Danish economy internationally competitive” (Pedersen 2005: 17) 
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made both private and public organisations at local and national level, important actors 
(Pedersen 2005: 14).  
 
Along with the discourse more actors have become included in the negotiated 
economy, the reformulation of discourse has also brought about restructuring of the 
state, followed by decentralisation of competences from the states, to both public and 
private organisations.  
In relation to the labour market, changes can be traced in the negotiation, as a result of 
this intuitional development. The labour market negotiations have become a part of a 
set of organised negotiations and more policy areas have been linked to it. An 
organised system of negotiations has been established, where labour market wage 
negotiations have been connected to the negotiations of the public budget. The 
negotiations concerning the Public budget20, negotiated between government and 
parliament, determine the public expenditures every year. This negotiation set 
constrains on another set of negotiations between government and local authorities21. 
Both sets of negotiations are influencing the wage negotiations in the labour market, 
since it put cost limit on the wage negations between peak organisations within the 
public and private labour market .All three sets of negotiations are also influencing 
negotiations taking place at lower levels “ lower level negotiations are sequenced in 
accordance with the rhythm of the three negotiations which sets limits on and policy 
targets for issue oriented negotiations at various levels such as the jointed shaping of 
national polices (labour training, social policy, employments etc.), sectoral bargaining 
and negotiations at the plant level regarding work conditions” (Pedersen 2005: 20). 
This way, organised negotiations in which all the major collective actors are 
represented, link distributional packages such as income policy, pension, taxation and 
social security, into productivity gaols and set long and shot term limits for the whole 
economy.   
 
                                                 
20 Finanslovsforhandlinger. 
21 Kommunal økonomiske forhandlinger 
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Furthermore negotiations on wage- and labour market policy have also become 
interlocked with other issues. The wage policy has changed in the 1980, from being 
decided by income policy to become managed by consensus in bi- and tri party 
negotiations between peak organisations and the government. This creates a system of 
indirect control of wages through the negotiations, rather than direct state interventions. 
This liberty, or institutional flexibility, require that both private and public 
organisations were willing to implement wage limits without government intervention 
(Pedersen 2005: 21). The Ministry of Finance controls and manages the wage and 
income formation to make sure, that it is conducted in accordance with the targets and 
cost limits of the state budget negotiations. The wage formation has become interlinked 
with issues such as introduction of new technology, work time reduction, 
individualisation of pay agreements and job security (Pedersen 2005: 21). 
 
Also labour market policies have become interlocked into a generalised system of 
negotiations. In 1990 four labour market reforms were implemented, where policy 
measures were decentralised to regional corporatistic bodies. The intention was to 
restructure the composition of the labour force and its flexibility through pre-
employment and job training programs. The reforms involved more partners such as 
local and regional authorities, trade unions and employer’s organisations, and plant 
level (Pedersen 2005: 22).  
 
The negotiated economy, in which the labour market is an essential part, can be said to 
have gone through two different processes of integration. There has been a quantitative 
integration, in the sense, that an increased amount of participants has been included and 
there has been a qualitative integration, meaning that policy areas have been linked. 
Further more authority has been decentralised both to private institutions but also to 
local level “in other words, new privileges were established and autonomy and 
authority was spread out across private and public institutions and decentralised to 
regional and local and the plant level” (Pedersen 2005: 22). The negotiated economy is 
thus characterised by continuous institutional development, which is guided by the 
constant reformulation of the mutual understanding of socio economic problems. The 
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negotiated economy is therefore dynamic and contains a high degree of flexibility and 
learning capacity, which makes it capable of adapting to changes (Pedersen 2005: 34). 
 
5.3. Institutionalism 
It is difficult to give a clear-cut definition of institutions, since there is a vast amount of 
definition and theories, on the subject. In broad terms, three types of institutionalism 
can be identified: rational-, historical- and sociological institutionalism, which all seek 
to explain policy processes. This project will not contain a discussion between the three 
scholars. Instead this chapter will illustrate how the labour- market in terms of 
negotiated economy, is to be understood, as an institution, and it will be demonstrated 
how the basic assumptions of sociological institutionalism fit the concept of negotiated 
economy. 
 
Firstly it is important to state, that the core of the negotiation economy theory is that 
negotiations are based on a mutual understanding of the socio economic problems, 
which is developed through a process of deliberate influence of preference. This basic 
feature, is contradicting the main precondition of theories on rational institutionalism, 
who perceive agent as acting on rational and exogenously created preferences, to 
optimise there own gains (Pollack 2001:234). Thus rational institutionalism, cannot 
give an adequate explanation of the labour market bargaining, since it ignores the 
endogenous shaping of preferences and the socialisation of the actors into the 
generalised system of negotiations. 
 
Secondly the concept of negotiated economy explain changes in the institution as being 
the outcome of both economic events in the Danish economy, but also the outcome of 
continuous reflections on and discourse creation about, the effectiveness of the Danish 
system itself 22(Pedersen 2005: 2). Negotiated economy is thus characterised by high 
level of institutional learning, which differs from the historical institutionalism, where 
                                                 
22 For example public bodies have become more goal and market oriented and open to dialog with other 
public bodies and private actors, through decentralisation and creation of corporation models such as the 
one created in the Ministry of Industry in the 1980s (Pedersen 2005: 13) 
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institutions are characterised by path dependency, and are perceived as changing 
mainly through critical junctures of radical change (March & Olsen 2005: 15). Within 
the negotiated economy changes are perceived as a continuous process of institutional 
learning, rather than being a period of institutional continuity interrupt by critical 
junctures. 
 
The generalised system of negotiation, in which labour market negotiations are 
included, is to be understood as more than just an arena in which actors can present 
their short- term interests, or just an arena for decision-making. It is rather a rational 
context in which actors are able to evaluate specific, and short- term interest, in the 
light of mutual interest and long- term consequence (Pedersen 2005: 25). The 
institution in negotiated economy is to be understood as a bargaining process between 
multiple partners, where conscious shaping of preferences, is an essential element. This 
reflects a perception of the institutions, that fits the definition made by March and 
Olsen “ Institutions are not simply equilibrium contracts among self-seeking 
calculating individual actors or arenas for contending social forces. They are 
collections of structures, rules and standard operating procedures that have a partly 
autonomous role in political life” (March & Olsen 2006: 4). The bargaining process, 
within the negotiated economy, should not only be perceived as an aggregative process, 
where the outcome is an aggregated of different rational political preferences (March & 
Olson 1998: 950). It should rather be perceived as an integrative process, where the 
actors present and form their ideas. Actors enter into bargain, with the aim of reaching 
decisions based on consensus, in a bargaining process, which is subordinated a mutual 
understanding of the socio economic problems.  
The institution is consisting of both concrete bargaining about ex wages but also the 
creation process of the socio economic discourse. According to theories of negotiated 
economy, three types of strategic games can be identified. The first type of game is 
languages games, which concerns the construction of socio economic problems. The 
parties engaged in the negotiated economy, give their interpretation through statements, 
semi scientific papers and publication, to influence the mutual understanding of socio 
economic problems in the Danish economy (Pedersen 2002: 25). Another type of 
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game, taking place is negotiation games, where coalitions are established, is to 
determine who is participating in the round table negotiations. These two games lead to 
the Round table negotiation23, where the government and local authorities collaborate 
with organised institutions, to create solutions and develop compromises. The round 
table negotiations are based on the outcome of the two other games, and the bargaining 
is founded on common understanding of the socio economic problems (Pedersen 2005: 
26).   
 
The sociological institutionalism, introduces two concepts, which can explain the agent 
in the negotiated economy, these are logic of consequences and logic of 
appropriateness. 
Logic of consequence entails, that actors are rational and they choose among 
alternatives by evaluating their likely consequence for personal or collective objectives, 
conscious that other actors are doing likewise (March & Olsen 1998: 949). The logic of 
consequence can be found, in the organisation’s strategically positioning, through the 
three above-mentioned games.  
Logic of appropriateness means that actions are rule base, in the sense that actors act in 
accordance with the role it posseses and in accordance with the expectation to that role, 
rather than acting on rational interest “Action involves evoking an identity or role, and 
matching the obligations of that role or identity in a specific situation” (March & 
Olson, 1998: 951). This form of rule based behaviour differs from strategic or 
instrumental behaviour, because the agents, “try to do the right thing, rather than 
optimise their given preferences (Risse 2005: 163). 
The negotiation environment in the negotiated economy requires that the agents are 
socialised into a bargaining process, where they are exposed to and influenced by 
preferences of other participant (Pedersen 2005: 2-3). The liberty to bargain is based on 
an expectation, that the partners share responsibility for the Danish economy as a 
whole, when they negotiate, and that they reach agreements based on consensus, while 
remembering that the mutual understanding of socio economic problems is prevailing 
                                                 
23 The participants are those who are willing to signing agreements based on mutual understanding. 
Excluded partners can influence the negotiations by lobbying or creating media campaigns (Pedersen 
2005: 26) 
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over individual rational preferences. The mutual understanding of socio economic 
problems is thus a norm, which is constraining the actors. But since the socio economic 
discourse is created through collective framing24 and articulation of socio economic 
problems. The socio economic discourse is the outcome of a process where the 
autonomous actors deliberately seek to influence preferences. Thus actors are not only 
constraint by the socio economic discourse, they also have the possibility for shaping it 
(Pedersen 2005: 27). 
 
The concept of negotiated economy and sociological institutionalism, provides the 
arguments for how the labour market, can be understood being imbedded in a larger 
network of policy areas, where negotiations take place among partners guided by both 
rational preferences and common preferences created through a process of deliberate 
influence of preferences.  
                                                 
24 A process, where the organisations codify (verbalise agreements, create strategies etc) and formulate 
problems, which they articulate through publications and statements, to gain influence on the socio 
economic discourse (Pedersen, 2005. p.24) 
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6. Flexicurity 
In this chapter we will take a closer look at the mechanics of the Danish flexicurity 
model. A model which in latter years has become the new role model for the EU, 
because it seems to be able to combat the growing unemployment in the EU, while 
keeping a low inflation, thus fulfilling not only the Lisbon goals, but at the same time 
staying within the bounds of the Stability and Growth pact and the EMU. The Stability 
and Growth pact will be introduced in further details later in the project. In addition to 
this the Danish model also seems to facilitate a continued education of the workforce, 
thus contributing to the Lisbon goal of education and training for living and working in 
the knowledge society. 
 
The word flexicurity is a combination of flexibility and security, and the term is used 
about a labour market in which employees can easily be hired and fired (flexibility), 
but where the labour unions and the stat guarantees substantial unemployment benefits 
(security). In the case of the Danish model there is a third part to flexicurity; namely an 
active labour market policy through various means (Andersen & Mailand, 2005: 2-
3).Furthermore we are also going to take a closer look at the macroeconomic variables 
which could have influenced the Danish labour market, besides the three elements 
flexibility, security and active labour market policy.  
 
6.1. Flexibility 
Which forms does flexibility then take on the Danish labour market, and what are the 
effects of the different forms? We have found four primary types of flexibility: 
 
1. External numeric flexibility is the ability of firms to hire and fire employees. We 
will present two OECD surveys in order to uncover the level of employment protection 
on the Danish labour marked. The first survey focuses on the level of Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL). The countries in the survey are given an Employment 
Protection Legislation (EPL) rating, depending on how hard it is to fire employees. The 
harder it is, the higher is the ELP rating for the country. The survey gives the 
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Mediterranean EU countries an ELP at around 3,5. Germany gets 2,5 and so does 
Sweden with whom Denmark is often compared. Denmark however gets a rating of 1,5 
which is more comparable with countries like the UK and Ireland who gets an EPL 
rating of around 1. (Kongshøj 2005: 14)  
 Figure 15. Overall EPL Stricness (Kongshøj 2005: 14) 
However as this survey only focuses on the legislative part, the hard or written law, we 
feel that it misses an important aspect of the Danish labour marked model namely the 
shop steward (tillidsmand) function. The shop steward represents a direct link between 
the employees, the employers and the labour union, they are present in every 
workplace in Denmark, and they act with the full authority of the union they represent 
(http://www.leksikon.org/art.php?n=2564). To say that this means the labour unions 
are always present and up to speed in every firm in Denmark is properly an 
exaggeration, but it is close to. This means that the survey probably doesn’t uncover 
the full extent of employee protection in Denmark as the continued presence of a union 
spokesman in the workplace, all else equal, will make it harder to fire someone.  
The second survey, which is also from the OECD, focuses specific on the protection of 
single persons hired on time-unlimited contracts. This especially is interesting because 
this is the most common form of employment contracts on the Danish labour market 
(Andersen & Mailand, 2005: 14). In this survey Denmark receive a score of 1,5 which 
once again is closer to the UK score of 1,1 then the Swedish score o 2,9 (Andersen & 
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Mailand 2005: 15). In other words Denmark once again places itself closer to the 
liberal Anglo-Saxon system, then the social democratic Scandinavian system. Of 
course this survey also neglects to take the effects of the shop stewards into 
consideration. 
One thing is of course to have low employment protection another question is whether 
or not this is used. A measure for this is the “average tenure for employees”, in 
Denmark the average job tenure is 8 years. The Danish average tenure can be compared 
to the one in highly flexible countries such as US and UK. Italy is around 12 years and 
Greece 13 years. Sweden has a quite high average tenure, at almost 12 years as well. 
 
Figure 16.Average tenure 
The interesting thing in this respect is that the level of worker turnover is 30% on 
average, and no lower then 25%, taken as an average from 1985-1995. This turnover 
level seems to be widely distributed, and not just limited to a small group of highly 
mobile workers. (Andersen & Mailand, 2005: 12-13) What this means is that mobility 
is very much an integrated concept to the average worker. An explanation for this 
could be that Denmark is dominated by SMEs. This means that in comparison to 
countries with large enterprises the entry barriers are lower, i.e. it is easier to get a new 
job (Kongshøj 2005: 15). 
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2. Internal numeric flexibility is working hour flexibility. This is the ability to increase 
the employees working hours in peek periods, and to decrease it when there aren’t any 
pending projects. This ability has been in the labour market compromises since 1967, 
in the original agreement the employers could vary the working hour’s as long as the 
working week was kept on average over a 6 week reference period. The reference 
period was in 1995 prolonged to 6 months, under the condition that both employers and 
employees, in the individual firms, could reach agreement about the planning. There 
was, from both sides, some anxieties whether local agreement could be reached, but the 
problems where overcome and in 1998 the reference period was expanded to 12 month. 
(Andersen & Mailand 2005: 17)  
    
3. Functional flexibility is akin to internal numeric flexibility in the sense that it 
focuses on the people already employed in the company. Functional flexibility focuses 
on the employees’ ability to handle more work functions within the firm. The benefits 
of this is twofold, first of all the employee is less likely to be get worn down, 
physically as mentally, by performing a monotonous work, resulting in higher job 
satisfaction and fewer sick days. Secondly it means that the company as a whole 
becomes more resistant to unexpected worker shortages, e.g. sickness, because other 
employees can handle the job functions of those who are absent. A very important part 
of functional flexibility is vocation training. In 1991 a labour market compromise was 
reached which guarantied all employees, with at least 9 months tenure, one week of 
vocation training a year. In 1993 this was raised to two weeks. An external effect of 
internal flexibility in general, and of vocation training in particular, is that it increases 
the workers external flexibility. This could mean that employers would risk loosing the 
money they have invested in there employees. However verdicts have been passed that 
obliges employees, who have received very expensive vocation training, e.g. MBA-
degrees, to either stay with there current employer or pay back the value of there 
vocation training. One would of course assume that this limits the employees’ 
flexibility; on the other hand it does, to some extent, ensure a continued investment 
from firms into vocation training. (Andersen & Mailand, 2005: 18-19)    
 66
4. Wage flexibility is almost self-explanatory. It is a measure of how much leeway 
there can be in employee wages. Historically wage agreements have been quiet 
centralized in Denmark, in the late ’80 and early ‘90 34% of all DA/LO employees 
were covered by centrally agreed wages, and another 40% were covered by agreements 
were the wage was negotiated locally but were a minimum wage had been agreed on 
centrally. Since then the system has become more flexible, in 1993 only 16% were 
covered by centrally agreed wages, and the amount of employees who are employed 
under schemes with no centrally agreed wage has risen from 4% to 22% of all DA/LO 
employees. (Andersen & Mailand, 2005: 20-21) As the majority of workers are still 
employed under a centrally agreed minimum wage with local wage negotiations this 
makes for a system which can be both flexible and inflexible. On the one hand one can 
imagine a situation were companies are desperate for labour, in this situation they will 
be able to offer large wages to the workers they want. One the other hand if they 
companies find themselves in trouble they can flatly refuse to offer anything more than 
the minimum wage. Of course if the minimum wage is too high for the companies to 
bear they will be in trouble, but as we have described in they above chapter the 
centralised negotiation system in Denmark should prevent this from happening.  
 
6.2. Security 
In this section we are going to take a closer look on the security part of flexicurity. In 
1997 OECD conducted a survey of the perceived job security. On average 70% of all 
employees stated that they “disagreed very much” with the statement that “my job is 
secure”. With the large degree of flexibility in the Danish system, as explain above, it 
is very interesting that in the survey only 44% of the Danish employees “disagreed 
very much” with the statement that “my job is secure”. (Andersen & Mailand 2005: 
22). This might seem like a paradox in comparison to what we have so fare written 
about the high degree of flexibility in the Danish system.  
This paradox can be explained by different factors. Denmark consists mainly of SMEs, 
with low entry barriers, as mentioned in the flexibility part above. The knowledge that 
it isn’t that hard to get a new job if you loose your old one, probably does a lot to 
combat employee insecurity. (Madsen, 2005: 15) One must also keep in mind the fall 
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in unemployment, which had characterised the Danish labour marked since 1994, 
probably meant that people in 1997 general were optimistic towards there job situation.  
In addition to this there is also the unemployment benefits system. Below is presented 
an OECD comparison of net replacement rates (NRR). NRR is a measure of the 
average unemployment benefits presented as a percentage of an individuals wage 
earnings. The Danish unemployment benefits system has an NRR of 80%, a level that 
is almost unparalleled outside Scandinavia. 
  
Figure 17. Average NRR (Kongshøj 2005: 16) 
 
The substantial NRR in the Danish system means that it is not an economical disaster 
for the individual to become unemployed. This means, all else equal, that Danish 
employees will be more inclined to accept job insecurity, as they are guaranteed a quite 
high income even if they should become unemployed (Andersen & Mailand 2005: 24). 
This ties into Nicolas Barr’s theories of risk aversion, which we will examine more 
later in this chapter. However economists with a neo-classical approach would argue 
that this level of NRR would significantly lower people’s incentive to get a job, as we 
have discussed in chapter 3.   
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In addition to the above mentioned there is also the active labour market policy. The 
active labour market policy is not as much a part of the security system as it is a tool to 
move people from unemployment to employment. The active labour market policy was 
implemented in 1994 as a replacement for an earlier unsuccessful initiative. The aim of 
the active labour market policy was two fold. The first part focused on increasing the 
motivation and abilities of the unemployed in order to make it easier for them to re-
enter the labour market. This was to be done be cutting back the amount of time they 
could be passive in they’re unemployment, forcing them in to activation earlier. The 
activation should then be more attuned to the individuals needs. The second part 
focused on creating opportunities for unemployed to re-enter the labour market. Of 
course this sort of labour market polices cost. Transfer payments and active labour 
market policies costs in excess of 4,5% of the GDP in 2002,This places Denmark as the 
EU country that spends the most on labour market policies. 
 
Figure 18. Expediture on ative and passive labour market policy (Kongshøj 2005: 18) 
 
So why does the Danish state use all this money on the unemployed? The answer is 
that the hope to improve the flexibility of the Danish labour by lowering the risk of 
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flexibility. To get a theoretical foundation for this theory we turn to Nicholas Barr and 
his theories of risk. 
The Danish states could let people be privately responsible for there own 
unemployment insurance.  
The question is if unemployment insurance would work as private insurance scheme. 
For this to work, and be profitable for both insurance companies and the policy holders 
the insurance companies would have to turn the uncertainty that both they and the 
policy holders face into a calculable risk (Barr 2004: 108). Barr lists three requirements 
for turning uncertainty into risk25: 
1) Knowledge about the event: To make a private insurance scheme work, the 
insurance company must have information available about how frequent the 
occurrence of the event is. The variable here can stem from uncertainty about 
the future, which as we all know is unpredictable. In relation to pension 
schemes this is average living age, but regarding unemployment this becomes 
more difficult. 
2) Frequencies: A requirement for frequency is the event is independent- the 
person taking up the insurance should not be able to affect the outcome himself. 
If this is possible then result is a situation called moral hazard. 
3) Repetition- law of large numbers- the more people taking up the insurance the 
more secure, the probability calculations are. When more people participate in 
the scheme, more precise calculations of the frequency of the event can be 
conducted. If there are too few observations then the variable becomes to 
unpredictable and the uncertainty to big. 
Only when these requirements are fulfilled, there is the basis for private business 
without public intervention. In the case of unemployment insurances there is an 
incalculable moral hazard that means that it becomes impossible to calculate an 
actuarial premium (Barr 2004: 108). In addition in a private system there is the risk 
of free riding and external costs, the first being a function of the second. E.g. if a 
person without insurance becomes unemployed he will starve. Two things can then 
                                                 
25 As presented by Jesper Jespersen in a lecture the 27th of march 2006 
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happen, society may take pity on him and give him food, if this is the case, then it 
will lead to a free rider problem as others begin to wonder why they should pay for 
the benefits of insurances, when others can get it for free. The other outcome is that 
society does nothing and leaves the unemployed to starve to death. Society will 
then be faced with the cost of either removing the body, or increased health 
spendings when the body rots. In the later case there may also be an external 
psychic cost, as people may not like to live in a society that lets people die from 
starvation. (Barr 2004: 173) 
In a mandatory public scheme the free riding and the external costs would be 
avoided. The risk of moral hazard will still exist, but as the state is able to make 
active labour market legislation it is able to limit the extent of the moral hazard.  
6.3. Conclusion: 
Flexicurity works as it combines the labour effectiveness of flexibility with the risk 
aversion of security. In addition it also incorporates some degree of vocation training 
and upgrading of the labour force. However many of the OECD survey seem to fail to 
capture the soft laws of the Danish labour market, such as the shop steward function. 
A more through evaluation of the Danish flexicurity model will be done in relation to 
the Lisbon goals later in the project. 
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7. The 1994 labour market reform 
Since the 1970s, different unemployment policies have been implemented to cope with 
the experienced rising unemployment in the Danish labour market. In the 1970s, the 
focus of the labour market policies, were on public job creation, job training both in 
public and private entities, and target unemployment training. Until 1993, the main 
content of labour market policy, aiming at coping with long term unemployment, took 
form of job offer programs, support to unemployed to start up there own business26. 
The results were poor and in the 1990s, after experiencing a ten years period of almost 
constant rising unemployment, the politicians were forced to do some restructuring 
efforts. The Danish unemployment was perceived as being structural in the sense that 
not even an economic upswing alone could cope with the rising problem. This lead to 
the creation of different changes in the labour market policy, which became effective 
from the 1st of January 1994, this collection of changes was labelled the labour market 
reform of 1994. The reform coincides with the fall in unemployment and slight 
increase in employment. This event raises the questions, what are the special features 
of this reform, which could have caused the development in the positive development 
in the Danish labour market?  
 
The official aim of the Danish labour market policy implemented in 1994 was to 
address both structural and long-term unemployment. The reform aimed at creating a 
well functioning labour market, through implementation of instruments, creating a 
continuous increase in the qualifications of the workforce, to avoid bottlenecks27 and 
other imbalances between supply and demand for labour. The other important aim, was 
to cope with long-term unemployment, through varies initiatives aimed at removing the 
obstacles that prevented the long-term unemployed from entering the labour market 
(Kongshøj 1999: 55). These goals were firstly stated separately, but the focus since the 
1990s has been to integrate them, in a comprehensive approach, combining activation 
of long-term unemployed with the upgrading of the skills of the working force as a 
whole (Kongshøj 1999: 55). The result was a labour market reform, consisting of two 
elements; a Steering reform and an Activation reform. 
                                                 
26 This instrument is called iværksætterydelse, in Danish terms. 
27 The effect of bottlenecks is described in chapter 3.  
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The Steering Reform28 consisted of a decentralisation of the implementation of the 
labour market policy to Regional Labour Market Councils29, which are composed by 
representatives from the Employers Federations, Trade Unions and local authorities. 
The steering reform was based on the idea that, labour market policies would provide 
the best results, when conducted as close as possible, to the parties involved, i.e. the 
unemployed and the firms. The main arguments for the decentralisation was, to make 
labour market policy more flexible, in the sense that it would respond to local needs 
(Kongshøj 1999: 57). Thus considerable authority was delegated to the Regional 
Labour Market Council, which was empowered to design activation programs 
matching the local condition, in accordance with requirements and instruments decided 
at national level. To facilitate the decentralisation and to make sure, that decisions 
made at the regional level were in line with the goals of the national labour market 
policy, systems of planning, guidelines, central monitoring and qualitative and 
quantitative targets to be met by the regional authorities, were established (Kongshøj, 
1999: 56). Important tasks in relation to solving labour market problems, should be 
performed at regional level, such as identifying groups at risk of unemployment, 
coordinate the activities of the labour market office (AF) and local authorities, and 
monitor the labour market situation in the region. 
The steering reform also included an increased involvement of the social partners at 
regional level, based on the arguments, that the quality of the labour market policy 
would increase if the social partners were involved in designing and implementing the 
labour market policy (Kongshøj 1999: 57)30.  
 
The Activation Reform mainly changed the perception of the purpose of activation. 
Activation should be performed in order to upgrade the qualifications of the 
                                                 
28 Styringsreformen in Danish terms   
29 Regionale arbejdsmarkedsråd, in Danish terms 
30 Kongshøj notes, that one should be aware of the problems arising from involving social partners, such 
as democratic deficit and policy making being controlled by organised interest. Further more also 
problems concerning division of competences between regional and national level, and between the 
actors at local level, which newer reforms are dealing with (Kongshøj 1999: 57). But these problems fall 
outside the scope of the project, since the focus of the project is on the consequences for the labour 
market.  
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unemployed, and improve their position in the labour market. This was a quite 
innovative consideration, compared to job offering programs, applied until the early 
90s. 
The Activation reform consisted of four different policy changes: 
1. Implementation of a two-period system. 
The system for insured unemployed was restructured, by implementing a two period 
system. The period for unemployment benefits31, was reduced from nine years to a five 
year program combined with an obligation to participate in activation programs, in 
1993 (Kongshøj 1999: 65). The first period, which was of two years duration, the 
unemployed would receive unemployment benefits, while being encouraged do job 
search actively. The second period, the activation period, would begin, if the 
unemployed did not succeed in finding a job during the first period. The activation 
period is of three years duration, and in this period the unemployed is obliged to 
activation, taking form of educational or job training, on a full time basis, preparing 
and qualifying the unemployed for an ordinary job. If the unemployed did not succeed 
in finding a job, within the second period, she would looses her right to activation 
benefits, and would have to apply for the means tested social security benefit32. The 
Danish unemployment system, consist of assistance for both insured and non-insured 
unemployed persons. The main difference of the two systems, is, that un-insured 
people receive social security benefits, which are means tested, unlike the 
unemployment benefit paid to the insured persons. However, the two systems has been 
standardised, in the sense that educational programs and job training during the 
activation period, in both systems, generally pays an income equal to unemployment 
benefits (Kongshøj 1999: 71). To receive unemployment benefits in the Danish system, 
the unemployed must be actively seeking jobs and must also accept job offers made by 
the Labour Market Office (AF). The aim of the new system introduced is to qualify the 
unemployed for job, and encourage the unemployed to seek jobs. The drawback 
inherent in this system is that if the employed is offered a temporary low paid job, the 
incentive to take the work is low, due to the fact that additional income will be 
                                                 
31 In Danish ‘dagpenge’ 
32 One year of ordinary work is then required, before the person can re-enter this five years program ( 
Kongshøj 1999: 59) 
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responded by a cut in the unemployment or social security benefit. This effect is 
strengthened by the high marginal taxation, on work in Denmark (Kongshøj 1999: 59). 
Another drawback is that unemployed are not contributing to their labour market 
pension fund, and they are therefore not increasing their future pension. 
 
2. Individual action plan 
Individual action plans, were implemented as a mandatory instrument for dealing with 
long- term unemployed. The individual action plan is a management of long-termed 
unemployed, which combines, the needs of the individual with the needs of the local 
labour market. Thus the 1994 reform also expressed a switch away from rule- based 
management of the long-term unemployed, towards upgrading of qualifications 
focusing on the competences of the individual (Kongshøj 1999: 56).  
 
3. Removal of the connection between unemployment benefit and job training. 
The connection between unemployment benefits and job training was interrupted, 
meaning that the participant in job training programs could no longer, extent the right 
to obtain unemployment benefits, if he or she did not find a job at the end of the job 
training period (Kongshøj 1999: 56).  
 
4. Introduction of Paid leave schemes. 
A fourth element of the activation reform, was the establishment of three different paid 
leave schemes, including paid leave for education, sabbatical reasons or child-minding. 
The schemes were first introduced in 1992, but became an integrated part of the labour 
market policy in 1994, due to its popularity (Kongshøj 1999: 59). The function of the 
paid leave schemes was to encourage both employed and unemployed to take leaves 
for a limited time period. Giving unemployed people the possibility of applying for 
leave schemes had the purpose of upgrading their qualifications through educational 
leave, or letting them take care of their children, which could bring down, public 
expenditures on child care. The motivation for offering leave schemes to employed 
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people was to encourage job rotation and upgrade the qualifications of the workforce 
(Kongshøj 1999: 60). 
In cases, where the schemes results in job rotation, temporary positions for unemployed 
persons are created. The unemployed person, taking up the vacant position, will get 
both job- and educational training, which aims at preventing people from being locked 
down in long- term unemployment. Another purpose of the paid leave schemes is to 
deal with the entering barriers for long-term unemployed such as statistical 
discrimination33, which serves the purpose of increasing their chances for getting an 
ordinary job. Job rotation and upgrading of the skill of the workforce are important 
aspects of the paid leave schemes, and it is actually made a mandatory requirement, 
that the employer finds a substitute when letting the employed apply for sabbatical 
leave schemes.  
 
Thus the labour market reform in 1994, introduced varies instruments, which were 
created and combined to deal with structural unemployment and bottleneck problems, 
by focusing on upgrading the skills of the unemployed. Another important task of the 
reform was to deal with long-term unemployment, through job rotation programs 
aimed at integrating long-term unemployed, through the creation of temporary 
positions. The reform represents important changes in labour market policy, since 
upgrading the qualifications of the unemployed and improving their situation on the 
labour market, became central in labour market policy. But to what extent has the 
reform contributed to the falling unemployment experienced from the mid-1990s?  
                                                 
33 Statistical discrimination, is occurring when employees avoid to hire long- term unemployed, because 
of the fear, that the unemployment is caused by the qualities of the person (Kongshøj 1999: 60)   
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8. Something remarkable in the state of Denmark  
In the following chapter we will examine the positive development in the Danish 
labour market, in order to determine what might have caused the change. The focal 
point is the 1994 labour market reform and the changes it brought about. The analysis 
tries to uncover if the development is due to an increase in hidden unemployment, or a 
decrease in cyclic or structural unemployment. The specific numbers that the graphs 
are calculated from are in appendix 1-7. 
These three figures form the basis of the positive development, where it is seen that 
from 1993 and forwards unemployment drops dramatically, employment increases 
slightly and the inflation hardly changes.  
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Figure 19 - The official (open) unemployment rate in Denmark (Statistics Denmark) 
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Figure 20 - Employment in Denmark  
Statistics Denmark does not have a consistent total employment number, so therefore OECD has been 
used in this case (OECD 2005: 18-19). Total full-time employment is however from Statistics Denmark. 
(Statistics Denmark) 
 
 
Figure 21 - The Danish Phillips-curve 1956-2002 (Kongshøj 2005: 10)   
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8.1. The statistics 
Whether or not there has been a real drop in unemployment has been disputed. The 
Center for Alternative Social Analysis (CASA) has emphasised that the unemployment 
statistics does not cover the hidden unemployment, and that a large part of the drop can 
be attributed to a transformation from nominal unemployment into hidden 
unemployment (CASA 2001). CASA claims that the total unemployment still is quite 
high and to a great extent hidden from the statistics. The reason is that people who do 
not have ordinary jobs are not counted among the registered unemployment. These 
people who are without ordinary jobs are those where the government pays their 
income, such as a leave of absence, under educational measures or on miscellaneous 
activation programs. If we follow this point of view, the activation and leave schemes 
introduced in the 1994 reform would have changed the unemployment statistics, but 
the reform would mainly have resulted in cosmetic changes rather than real effects. 
Since there wouldn’t really be any change that could have affected the inflation, the 
apparent horizontal Phillips curve from 1993 and forwards could perhaps support this 
view.  
If the massive and continuous drop in unemployment is really due to the manner in 
which the unemployment is registered then it should be possible to see it in some 
related statistics 
In figure 22 the number of persons that have received income replacing benefits of 
different kinds for a whole year has been listed in order of the different kinds of 
benefits.  
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Figure 22 - Persons on income replacing benefits (Statistics Denmark)  
 
What can be seen is that from 1993 and onwards the amount of people on 
unemployment benefits and social benefits falls dramatically with a simultaneously 
increase in the amount of people on early retirement, public activation, private 
activation and paid leave schemes. This seems to support the thesis that the 
unemployment drop is due to cosmetics, and that the previously registered unemployed 
has become unregistered unemployed. If this were true, then the total number of people 
on these five kinds of replacing benefits should not have changed very much. The 
development can be seen in figure 23: 
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Figure 23 - Five income replacing benefits (Statistics Denmark) 
 
It can be seen that the total number of the five indicators isn’t constant before and after 
1993. Interestingly the number increases steadily until 1993 and starts to fall from 
1995. There is some truth in the hidden unemployment critics since the fall in the two 
registered unemployment indicators, which are orange, is to some extend counteracted 
by an increase in the four remaining unregistered unemployment indicators. Some of 
those, who were on traditional unemployment benefits have either used the early 
retirement scheme or put on leave or activation programs. Yet hidden unemployment 
cannot explain why the number stops its steady increase in 1993 and starts to fall from 
1995, if the unemployment drop was all due to cosmetics, there shouldn’t have been a 
notably change in the total number.  
 
8.2. Structural factors 
The overall number of people on the five income replacing benefits starts to drop in 
1995, two years after the two registered unemployment indicators starts to drop. Since 
hidden unemployment apparently isn’t enough, additional explanations have to be 
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sought out. A possible explanation could be that active labour market policy actually 
does bringing down the structural unemployment and in fact put the unemployed 
people back into the open labour market. The argument would be that the unemployed 
person, who is put on educational leaves or activation program, is immediately 
transformed from registered to unregistered unemployed. After a while the unemployed 
gets an ordinary job either because the educational or activation program has removed 
the incentive to stay unemployed, or because he has acquired skills from the programs 
that increases his human capital enough to be employed. If this is a general tendency, it 
can explain why the drop occurs a year or two after the labour market reform. It takes 
some time before the labour market programs gives the unemployed person the skills 
they need. This argument is furthermore supported if the early retirement is removed 
from figure 2, since it represents a scheme that can just as well be used by employed 
workers who are older than 60 as unemployed, and therefore it isn’t possible to say if 
the large increase in early retirement consists of people who would have been 
employed or unemployed if the scheme didn’t exist.  
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Figure 24 - figure 23, without early retirement (Statistics Denmark). 
The reform was simultaneously designed to increase the efficiency of the labour market 
programs by decentralising them so they closer fit the needs of the parties involved. 
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Such an efficiency increase is of course very hard to measure through a quantitative 
method and would require interviews and other kinds of qualitative methods. However 
there is a possibility of seeing it through the Beveridge curve, where an inwards shift in 
the curve indicates a better match between the supply and demand for labour. A curve 
has been made by the Ministry of Finance in 1999, which covers 1980-1998. Statistics 
Denmark does not register the amount of vacancies, and therefore the number of vacant 
jobs reported to the public employment service has been used as an indicator for the 
overall number of vacant jobs. This, of course makes the Beveridge curve very 
ambiguous and not very trustworthy. Nevertheless it might be interesting to see what 
result the Beveridge curve gives: 
 
Figure 25 – the Beveridge curve analysed by the Danish Ministry of Finance (Finansministriet 1999:19) 
If the Beveridge curve is correct then it can be seen that the vacancy rate hardly 
changes from 1994 to 1998, whereas the unemployment rate halves. This could 
indicate a fall in structural unemployment, i.e. a better match between supply and 
demand in the labour market. However even if the curve is correct it doesn’t 
necessarily mean that structural unemployment has decreased, it could be interpreted in 
other ways, such as a hidden unemployment or that new jobs have been created which 
has absorbed some unemployment. 
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If a reduction in structural unemployment is the reason why the unemployment 
dropped, it should be possible to see a rise of employment in the sectors that previously 
were in need of workers with the right skills. Since the structural unemployment 
represents a better match between the human capital of the unemployed and the 
demands for labour. In figure 26 the total employment has been divided into eight 
sectors: 
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Figure 26 - persons employed in different sectors of the labour market (Statistics Denmark). 
Figure 26 shows that there is a rather substantial increase in employment from 1993 
and onwards, but it isn’t easy to see exactly where the increase originates. The 
following figures are selections of a few specific subdivisions of the eight sectors 
shown in fig 4. The selected subdivisions are the ones where there is a prominent 
change in employment around 1993. In order to make the numbers comparable, they 
are shown in index numbers.  
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Fig 27 - selected subdivisions of the employment, Index 100 = the number of employed in the specific 
subdivision in 199334 (Statistics Denmark)  
 
Does this selection shown that the active labour market programs work? If this was the 
case there should be a common theme in the kind of skills required before one can be 
employed in the selected sector divisions. What seems to be the common theme is that 
with the exception of advertising and marketing the kind of skills needed are some that 
require a short or medium education, especially the jobs in trade and handicraft that 
seems to dominate. Interestingly it doesn’t seem to be case that low skilled ‘McJobs’ 
dominate. Actually it is only the Restaurants subdivision, which could be suspected of 
having a high increase in low skilled jobs. This apparently seems to support the active 
labour programs, which is aimed at generating low and medium skills. However the 
active labour market hardly produces relatively long education it requires in the 
‘advertising and marketing’ business, which is one of the subdivisions where the 
proportional increase is most striking. 
                                                 
34 The total account of subdivisions is in appendix 1 
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Another indicator to a reduction in structural unemployment would be if the real 
increase in employment started to kick in at 1995, due to the active labour market 
programs attack on the negative hysteresis effect of unemployment, which figure 24 
and 25 indicates. But this doesn’t seem to be the case in figure 27 where the 
employment changes noticeably in 1993. 
 
8.3. Effective demand 
The crucial changing point in all of the statistics seems to be 1993, here the overall 
unemployment rate drops and the employment slightly increases. Hidden and structural 
unemployment can to some extend be used to explain the development, but as seen this 
doesn’t give an exhaustive explanation of why the turning point is in 1993, so only one 
thesis remains, that effective demand for goods and services had something to do with 
it. 
In fig 28, 29 and 30 the development in the effective demand is shown by its four 
components, as well as the bond interest rate and discount rate. 
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Figure 28 – the three domestic components of effective demand (the prices are also shown in fixed 1995 
prices so that they are easier compared the current prices are in the appendix 2) (Statistics Denmark).  
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Figure 29 – the balance of payment (Statistics Denmark). 
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Figure 30 – Interest rate (Statistics Denmark). 
 
What the figures show, is a notably increase in effective demand around 1993, 
especially driven by C and I, but only to a lesser extend by G. So from 1993 the 
domestic firms raise their investments and the households increase their demand for 
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goods and services, and the interest rate keeps on falling. This explains why [E-Im] 
starts to decline in 1993, since some of the increased demand is bound to go to 
imported goods and services, which put the balance of payments under pressure as the 
export is dependant on the world market, which doesn’t change just because there is a 
boost in the Danish economy.  
So how about the increase in employment shown in fig 26 and 27, can it be attributed 
to effective demand? The sectors that especially increased its employment was New 
constructions, Reparation and maintenance of buildings, Car commerce and 
maintenance, Retail and maintenance commerce except cars, Restaurants, Real estate 
commerce, Advertising and marketing, Public schools, Adult training. Apart from the 
two educational sectors, the general characteristic of these sectors is that they produce 
goods and services that have a high elasticity to C. This means that the private 
households have gained a permanent increase in income and a large part of this is 
spend on more luxurious goods and services, which makes the businesses who produce 
these luxurious goods and services employ more people. This can explain why more 
people are employed in the sectors of Car commerce and maintenance, Retail and 
maintenance commerce except cars, Restaurants, and also the Advertising and 
marketing, since the businesses hire people whose job it is to attract the increased 
personal consumption. The household does not only spend the increased income on 
goods and services that are consumed the moment they are produced, but since they are 
reasonable they also invest some of it. A well-known rule of thumb is to invest in real 
estate by buying bigger houses, building annexes or generally improve the real value of 
estate. If this is what happened in 1993 it would explain the increase in employment in 
the sectors of New constructions, Reparation and maintenance of buildings, Real estate 
commerce.  
When it comes to the educational subdivisions, the increased employment probably has 
other explanations than an increase in demand. The extra people employed in Adult 
training has probably been hired since the reform in 1994 facilitates more adult 
training, and when it comes to the Public schools, the explanation is probably that the 
demographic increase in children in the educational age increases slightly in these 
years (Statistics Denmark). 
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But why does demand increase in these years? Probably because of several 
simultaneously factors. In 1993 a social democratic government took office, which 
loosened the fiscal policy in the so-called ‘kick-start’ of the economy. At the same time 
a credit reform was implemented, which made it possible for house-owners to convert 
the fall in long-term interests rates into lower housing cost, which made it easier to 
invest in the housings (Kongshøj 2005: 9) The increase in private domestic investment 
could thereby be explained as an effect of the increase in personal consumption, since 
the firms who tries to meet the increased effective demand for their goods and services 
also invests in domestic products to meet the demand.  
 
8.4. Hidden, structural or cyclical? 
So is the low unemployment in Denmark due to a transformation into hidden 
unemployment, a better efficiency of the labour market or an increase in effective 
demand? First of all we have to recognise that the statistics can only indicate a 
development, furthermore there have only been shown a specific selection in the wide 
material, this means that not too much faith should be put in what a single statistic 
show. Especially the intentions to improve the qualifications of the unemployed, is 
very hard, if not impossible, to measure. However, there are some conclusions that can 
be drawn. It is indicated that some of the drop in unemployment is due to an increase in 
hidden unemployment, but not all of the development in the Danish labour market can 
be attributed to statistical cosmetics, since it coincides with a slight increase in 
employment. The question then remains is the rest of the development is due to a 
decrease in structural or cyclical unemployment? 
From the brief overview of the development in the labour market, it is not possible to 
say anything clear-cut about the whether or not it was due to structural or cyclical 
changes, since it would require more than just a quantitative statistical analysis. 
Therefore the two thesis have to be evaluated. If one looks at the structural changes, the 
argument that this was the cause would be that since the inflation doesn’t seem to 
accelerate in the years following 1993, the labour market has become more efficient in 
matching workers and vacancies, thereby avoiding bottlenecks and the inflationary 
pressure that they could bring about. Furthermore there is an indication that the active 
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labour market programs directed at the negative hysteresis effect of unemployment 
does work. This is further supported by the Beveridge curve, which shows that the 
number of vacancies does not increase after 1993, which indicates more efficient 
structures. Unfortunately the Beveridge curve is based on dubious material, and though 
it shouldn’t be discarded, it is a weak foundation to argue for a change in the labour 
structures.  
When it comes to cyclical unemployment, the subdivisions of sector where the increase 
in employment is most prominent seem to support that a reduction in cyclical 
unemployment has occurred. It is easily explained as a cause of an increase in personal 
consumption, since the subdivisions are those where the effect of an increase in 
effective demand would be expected. As it can be seen there is an increase in effective 
demand as well, which also supports this argument.  
Whether the explanation is structural or cyclical, changes are to some extend dependant 
on whether one uses a neo-classical or Keynesian explanation. In the neo-classical 
capital, labour and technology leads to production, which finally leads to demand. In 
the Keynesian approach the effective demand leads to production and employment 
(Jespersen 1994: 58). So which one is more likely? In order to say this it has to be seen 
what is more pragmatic. Following the neo classical thought, the increase in demand 
would be a cause of the increased productivity, i.e. the 1994 labour market reform 
would have increased L in the neo-classical production function, which resulted in 
more demand. The Keynesian approach would be that due to the ‘kick-start’ of the 
economy (increased G) and the credit reform (where the households gained easier 
access to liquidity that was previously bound in real estate) C increased, which lead to 
an increase in I and a fall in unemployment and increase in employment. The 
Keynesian interpretation seems more likely since it fits better with the different 
statistical material that is available and the changes that occur in 1993 and afterwards. 
It therefore seems to be more in tune with the events we observe in the real world. With 
that said the labour market reform of 1994 and especially the implementation of the 
two-period system of activation could have changed the incentive structure on the 
labour market and thereby pushed the unemployment down. So the conclusion is that 
the positive development in Denmark is a combination of several factors: some 
cosmetics changes of the statistics, some minor structural changes, which ought to fit 
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the match between unemployed workers and vacancies, but mainly a personal 
consumption led demand boost, which pushes the economy upwards and lubricates the 
reform. 
 
9. Sum up of flexicurity 
What is the link between flexicurity and the high amount of flexibility there is in the 
Danish labour market. Is there no connection between the low unemployment in 
Denmark and the flexicurity system, or is it all due to effective demand? The main 
components of flexicurity, the flexibility and the security are not new. The flexibility 
originates from the September compromise in 1899 and the security element was 
introduced in the 1960’. So it is hardly any of these that halved the unemployment, 
since had been in play for quite a long time. The labour market reform in 1994 did 
make a major reform of the active labour market policy and de facto implemented the 
third part of flexicurity. But as we already have seen the unemployment drop is 
primarily due to an increase in effective demand. The high flexibility and security 
didn’t prevent the unemployment to rise to 12%, so even though there was already a 
high amount of flexibility, which is craved by the European Member States, the Danish 
labour market still suffered from unemployment. Especially the high external 
numerical flexibility is prominent in Denmark. After all it isn’t really strange that high 
external numerical flexibility doesn’t create employment in it self. If there is an overall 
recession in the economy the enterprises can easily get rid of the abundant workers, 
who due to the recession will not be able to find vacancies that they can occupy. When 
the income of the worker thus decreases, personal consumption falls, which only 
deteriorates the recession. The high NRR in the Danish security system does act as a 
stabilizer so that C doesn’t fall to dramatically in a recession, but when a lot of 
unemployed workers are on employment benifits, it puts pressure on the public budget, 
and even more so in the Danish case where the unemployment benefits are substantial.    
Hence in a recession the high external numerical flexibility doesn’t postpone the ill 
effects.  
The same goes for an economy that is booming, but with the reverse effect. The thesis 
would be that if there is an increase in effective demand the high numerical flexibility, 
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in the flexicurity system will be able to deal with the demand more efficient. When 
there is an increase in effective demand for the goods and services of a firm, the 
employer needs to decide whether or not he should hire more workers who would 
increase the productivity of the firm, and thereby increase the profit to be made on the 
increased demand. Since demand can come and go, the employer is bound by an 
uncertainty of whether or not he can expect the demand to be a short boom or a more 
permanent growth. The employer does probably have some hunch about the future 
development, but nevertheless he can’t be sure. In the case of a low external numerical 
flexibility it would be very costly for the employer if he hired new workers to meet the 
increased demand, and the demand boom proved to be very short. Then the employer 
would have abundant workers whom he couldn’t easily get rid of. If the employer 
acknowledges this uncertainty, it would be more reasonable for him to not 
straightforwardly hire workers in a system with low external numerical flexibility. The 
point is that employer’s organise the future production after what they expect to be the 
future demand for the goods and services they produce, and these expectations are 
inherently uncertain. If the expectations prove to be wrong, the employers need 
flexibility in order to adjust as fast as possible to avoid the costs of a wrongly organised 
production, i.e. they need to be able to fire the abundant workers. In a system where 
there is a low external numerical flexibility the employer would be more reluctant to 
hire new workers to match the sudden boom in demand, since he cannot be sure of how 
long the demand will be there. Therefore the low external numerical flexibility will 
make the excess workers more costly. After all it’s better to be safe than sorry. In such 
a system a sudden increase in effective demand wouldn’t easily be converted into 
increased employment and increase in C. The potential problem of hiring new workers 
isn’t as big in a system with high external numerical flexibility, thus a sudden increase 
in effective demand would easily be absorbed by the labour market, which would mean 
that the effective demand would increase even more. The demand stimulation, which 
came in 1993 and 94 might therefore have had greater effect because the flexicurity 
system could easily absorb it and convert it into employment. 
 
In addition to the above there are also the institutions of the negotiated economy. On 
the face of things it may seem like a good idea that the social partners have a mutual 
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understanding of each other’s preferences, but does it have any influence on the 
economic development in Denmark? The negotiated economy is based on wage 
negotiations where there is a classic conflict of interest between employers and 
employees. It is in the interest of the employers to have as low wage costs as possible, 
whereas it would be in the interest of the employees to have high wages. A low 
unemployment rate would increase the bargaining power of the employees and vice-
versa. At a macro level neither pole is preferable to both the employers and employees, 
since it would slow down personal consumption if wages was kept low and therefore 
slow down the effective demand for goods and services, and it would increase inflation 
and weaken international competitiveness if wages rise too much, which would in 
effect create cyclic unemployment. At the micro level there isn’t much incentive for 
neither the employers nor employees to mind the macroeconomic development when 
negotiating wages. This changes when a large part of the wage negotiations happen at 
an aggregate level, the Federation of Danish Trade Unions and the Confederation of 
Danish Employers´ associations can thus avoid a ‘tragedy of the commons’. The 
parties can through a mutual understanding of each other’s preferences and through an 
increased social responsibility gained a common discourse in which they negotiate the 
wages of the labour market. This might have been why the parties made a joint 
declaration in 1987, where they stated that the negotiated wage increases were to be 
kept below international wage inflation levels. And this understanding might also have 
had an influence on why the inflation didn’t rise when the unemployment started to 
drop in 1993. The almost horizontal Phillips curve would have contradicted that the fall 
in unemployment was due to an increase in effective demand, since that in a simple 
understanding would have increased the inflation. The Phillips curve represents a 
relationship between the unemployment rate and an inflation rate due to rise in nominal 
wages, the horizontal development in the Phillips curve could be interpreted as an 
effect of increased socialisation and the joint declaration form 1987. This of course, is a 
bit of a vague conclusion, but nevertheless it does provide an explanation. 
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10. Discussion about the EMU- Zone 
The concept of flexicurity has now been defined and analysed, and the next step 
needed to come closer to an answer of the research question is, to reflect the knowledge 
gained in relation to the EMU-Zone. The discussion aims at answering the second work 
question: 
Which problems can flexicurity solve in relation to the unemployment problems of the 
EMU-zone? 
The fact that the Euro area has experienced a quite high level of unemployment is 
evident from the unemployment rate illustrated below. The unemployment has been 
fluctuating between 11% and 8% in the period from 1986 to 2004. In 1993 the 
unemployment rate reached 11% and was remaining at that level until the late 1990s. 
Thus the EMU-zone experienced a substantial unemployment, in the period prior to the 
Lisbon strategy and the establishment of the employment goals, emphasizing the need 
of increasing the employment rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31. Unemployment in the Euro area (OECD 2005: 40-41) 
When the discussion about flexicurity is drawn into a European context and reflected in 
relation to the Lisbon Strategy it is important to look at the goals set. Before the 
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employment goals are presented, the attention should be drawn to the economic frame, 
which constrains the goals of the Lisbon Strategy.. 
 
11. The Economic framework 
 
11.1. The Economic and Monetary Union 
The Maastricht treaty was signed in 1991, where 12 out of the EU15 Member States 
joint the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU).35 Since 1999, the national currencies 
have been irrevocably fixed to the Euro, which means that the 12 Member States can 
no longer conduct exchange rate policy. Within the EMU, the Member States have also 
lost sovereignty in relation the monetary policy, since this task is to be conducted 
centrally by the European Central Bank (ECB). Since the ECB has become in charge of 
two important macro economic instruments, it is important to understand the objectives 
sought by the ECB, when conducting macro economic policies. The Treaty obliges the 
ECB to secure prise stability as the primary objective. Price stability means, that the 
ECB should keep the inflation low i.e. at 2% (De Grauwe 2005: 214). The treaty states 
that other objectives like securing low unemployment can also be sought by the ECB, 
but the objective of prise stability is primary and will therefore always prevail. 
Therefore the ECB is much influenced by the monetarist politics focusing on restricting 
sources of inflation rather than coping with unemployment (De Grauwe 2005: 169). 
The problem inherent in centralising the monetary and exchange rate policy, is, that in 
case an asymmetric demand shock occurs36, the ECB will be paralysed since it cannot 
act by e.g. lowering the exchange rate in favour of the negatively hid country without 
damaging the economic situation of the positively hit country. Limiting the macro 
economic instruments, makes economic adjustment more difficult since the instruments 
                                                 
35 Sweden, Denmark and UK decided to stay out of the EMU, despite the fact that they actually satisfied 
the convergence criteria (De Grauwe 2005: 143). Though Denmark has chosen to fix its exchange rate to 
the Euro, by join the ERMII arrangement. Thus Denmark has to respect a central exchange rate and 
margins of fluctuations, set by the European Central Banc (De Grauwe 2005: 153). 
36 A asymmetric demand shock implies that consumers shift preferences away from the product of one 
country towards the product of another. The country negatively hit, will experience a decline in demand 
followed by a raise in unemployment, and the opposite will occur in the positively hit country. If the 
countries did not form part of a Monetary Union, this effect could be corrected through the use of 
monetary policy e.i the negatively hit country could devaluate to gain competitiveness (De Grauwe 
2005: 6-8).  
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normally applied to increase competitiveness and cope with unemployment problems 
steaming from asymmetric demand shocks are restricted. In the absence of a common 
safety net or social policy in the EMU, the stabilisation of the economic situation relies 
solely on the fiscal policy of the Member States. This fact brings another important 
factor into the debate, the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which is affecting the 
ability to conducting fiscal policy. Therefore we will now turn the focus onto the main 
effects that the SGP has on the Member States ability to conduct fiscal policy. 
                                                                                                                                                                         
11.1.1. The Stability and Growth Pact 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was created in 1997, with the purpose of 
preventing the Member States from creating large budget deficits. The SGP follows the 
Maastricht convergence criteria, which predetermined that Member States should avoid 
an excessive deficit i.e. the general government deficit should be kept at maximum 3% 
of GDP, and a general government debt should not exceed 60% of the GDP ( De 
Grauwe 2005: 143). According to the SGP, Member States are obliged to maintain this 
budgetary position, when they have entered the EMU.  
The SGP implies two instruments, a surveillance system and a dissuasive system. 
The surveillance part is an early warning system against excessive budgetary deficit, 
and it implies in short, that Member States have to submit a stability program, which 
makes evident that the individual member stats are steering toward “a budgetary 
position, close to balance or in surplus and the adjustment path towards this objective” 
(De Grauwe 2005: 229). The Council and the Commission control whether the 
program of each member state contains a margin, which is sufficient to avoid excessive 
deficit. If the margins of a country differ significantly from the margin, then Council 
formulate a recommendation to take action (De Grauwe 2005: 229).  
The dissuasive part of the SGP defines excesses deficit as being more than 3% of the 
GDP. The dissuasive part of the SGP is triggered, when the surveillance part is not 
providing sufficient results or when excessive deficit emerges. When Member States 
surpass the 3% criteria, they can seek to justify the event, before the council. 
Exceptional circumstances are established in the SGP, but can only be invoked insofar, 
the country in consideration experience a decline in GDP of more than 2% within a 
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year. Thus declines in GDP, falling within 0.75% and 2% are not sufficient to appeal to 
exceptional circumstances, and in case of such decline, the member state will be 
recommended by the council, to bring the budget back in balance within four months. 
If the member state does not succeed in stabilising the economic situation, it can 
ultimately lead to economic sanctions decided by the Council. The sanctions will take 
form of a non-interest bearing deposit of up to 0.5% of the GDP, and if the budgetary 
situation is not corrected, within two years, then the deposit turns into a fine (De 
Grauwe 2005: 229).  
 
11.2. The effects of the Stability and Growth Pact 
The argument for imposing rules for Member States budgets is grounded in fear of 
unsustainable budgetary behaviour. The sustainability of the budget is jeopardised 
when the interest rate of a government dept exceeds the growth rate of the economy, 
since this event will trigger a debt dynamic, which will lead to an ever, increasing 
government debt relative to GDP (De Grauwe 2005: 222). Hence if the nominal 
interest rate exceeds the nominal growth of the economy, the government must 
generate a primary budget surplus37, to prevent the debt ratio from increasing without 
limits, making the member state unable to stabilise the economic situation ( De Grauwe 
2005: 225). The SGP is implemented to prevent unsustainable economic development 
in the Member States by preventing them from issuing further dept. The requirement 
that Member States should maintain the public debt below 60% of GDP after entering 
the EMU, is requiring a debt ratio at 0 %, since the Member States cannot issue new 
debt, since almost all Member States are very close to the 60% debt limit.  
The drawback is, that the SGP restrict the ability to cope with unemployment at a 
national level. Increasing the budget deficit is not uncommon, during recession, since 
tax revenues decline while public expenditures to unemployment benefits increase. The 
SGP forces the countries to run government budgets with surplus in order to have 
sufficient flexibility during recession in order to avoid hitting the budget deficit ceiling 
of 3 % of GDP (De Grauwe 2005: 228). If countries are not able to do this, they are 
prevented from conducting an expansionary fiscal policy during economic recession, 
                                                 
37 Through a restrictive fiscal policy where the tax revenues exceeds the expenditures of the government 
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which creates the risk that the national budget is not capable of providing functional 
automatic stabilizers38, which can result in intensified recession (De Grauwe 2005: 
228). This effect is enhanced, by the fact that bad budgetary performance is penalised 
by the fine system. Furthermore the requests of the SGP can prevent the government 
from investing in human capital, welfare and measures improving the budgetary 
performance in the future. ( De Grauwe 2005: 232).  
The two budgetary requirements are thus reducing the economic flexibility of the 
Member States drastically. This has had crucial consequences in 2002-2004, when the 
Commission started procedures against France and Germany, who refused to conduct 
restrictive fiscal policy during the downturn, in order to get the budget back in balance 
(De Grauwe 2005: 240).  
The acknowledgement of the disadvantages has led to reforms of the SGP. The changes 
implies, that Member States with a low debt ratio39 and high growth potential, can 
maintain a deficit of 1 % over the business cycles, whereas countries with a substantial 
debt, are still obliged to maintain a balanced budget. The 3% deficit limit is 
maintained, though the conditions for invoking special circumstances are relaxed, 
meaning that countries with low or negative growth rates are allowed to exceed the 3% 
deficit requirements temporarily. Moreover Member States will be able to invoke more 
special circumstances, if the breach of the 3% norm, is caused by investments that will 
improve the future sustainability of the public budget. Finally if countries with a low 
debt level exceed the ceiling of 3%, they are allowed to adjust over a longer period, 
then countries with a high dept level ( De Grauwe 2005: 244). 
 
11.2.1. Economic schools and the EMU 
The economic frame consisting of the EMU and the SGP, is view quit differently 
within the economic schools presented in the project. 
                                                 
38 Fiscal policy is an automatic stabilizer, which reacts immediately to increase in unemployment, since 
the unemployment payments increase and the tax revenues decrease at once.  
39 The argument is, that the risk of default is less pronounced in countries with a relatively low public 
budget e.i below 60% ( De Grauwe 2005: 233) 
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The Monetarist40 are in favour of the monetary policy conducted by the ECB, as it 
reflects caution towards money supply in order to keep low inflation. Monetarist 
perceives the market forces as being able to find equilibrium, when left undisturbed. 
Thus centralisation of monetary polices are preferred in order to avoid disorder 
deriving from Member States individual conducts of economic policies. The monetarist 
will argue in line with the neoclassics, that the fixed exchange rate and firm monetary 
policy, will lead to more flexibility in the labour market (Amoroso 2002: 36). When 
Member States are prevented from conducting macro economic policy, flexible wages 
are needed, in order to adjust during recession deriving from temporary asymmetric 
demand shock. In the country negatively hit, the enterprises will experience a fall in 
production, leading to a fall in demand for labour resulting in unemployment. If the 
labour market is not distorted by trade unions, the unemployed problem can be solved, 
if worker reduce their wage claims sufficiently to meet the demand for labour (De 
Grauwe 2003: 7). The opposite will occur in the country hit positively, where the 
wages will rise due to the increased production, which will result in gained 
competitiveness in the country negatively hit. Thus through time, equilibrium will be 
restored and the economies have thus been adjusted through flexible wages. 
 
In the Keynesian perspective, market equilibrium is not obtained rapidly, especially not 
within the labour market, when market forces are left untouched, wherefore the costs of 
adjustment can be high “Having regard to human nature and our institutions, it can 
only be a foolish person who would prefer a flexible wage policy to a flexible money 
policy” (Keynes in Snowdon, 2005: 68) 
 In the Keynesian demand side perspective, wages flexibility cannot defeat 
unemployment, since employment is obtained through increase in effective demand. 
Government can through fiscal measures affect effective demand, and therefore 
measures such to prevent the conduction of such policy, must be perceived as an 
obstacle to influencing effective demand. In relation to the EMU and the SGP, Post 
Keynesians take up a sceptical position. Due to the fact that the differences between the 
Member States are quite pronounced, and due to the fact that the economies are less 
                                                 
40 It’s worth noting that not all monetarists are in favour of the EMU. (Amoroso 2002: 36) 
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integrated. Member States should be able to pursue different macro economic goals 
and preferences in relation to welfare policies (Amorose 2002: 37). Without 
instruments capable of affecting effective demand, server problems can arise from 
asymmetric demand shock, since rigidities will prevent adjustment. 
 
The economic framework of the EMU zone, has thus led to discussions both at a 
theoretical level as well as at a practical level. Due to the implications arising from the 
SGP, important changes have been conducted. Though one must conclude that the 
budgetary norms are still intact. 
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12. The Lisbon Employment Goals 
The Lisbon Strategy forms part of a further elaboration of the European Employment 
Strategy, which was launched in 1997, with the aim of achieving full employment, 
increased productivity and quality work and promoting cohesion (Wallace 2005: 293). 
The Lisbon Strategy gave further input to the European Employment Strategy by 
linking it to the broader economic and social agenda of EU (Wim Kok 2003: 13). The 
Lisbon Strategy, was launched in March 2000 and it contains a number of initiatives, 
goal and programs aimed at transforming the EU into a strong knowledge based 
economy, with high employment, in order to be able to face the challenges posed on 
the EU by the increasing globalisation (Consilium: 1).. The Lisbon Strategy was 
conceived in a period, where the EU faced an employment rate of only 61%, the overall 
aim of the strategy is to bring this up to 70% by 2010. (Consilium: 12). The 
assumption, upon which the Lisbon Strategy is based, is that if the measures 
established in the strategy, are implemented against a sound macro economic 
background then the EU will experience an average economic growth of 3% 
(Consilium:3). In order to reach this objective several goals were set up. Among the 
gaols set up, especially five goals stress the importance of employment explicitly41: 
 
1. More and better jobs for Europe: developing an active employment policy 
It is envisioned in the Lisbon Strategy that more jobs can be created through a more 
flexible management of working time and job rotation (Consilium: 11). In order to 
reach this goal, it is noted that Member States should consider, setting up national 
targets for an increased employment rate. Increasing the labour force, will furthermore 
contribute to a more sustainable social protection (Cosilium:12)   
2.Modernising social protection 
The Lisbon Strategy emphasises, that the social system, plays an important role in 
creating a knowledge-based economy. (Consilium: 2). It is envisioned that this goal can 
be reached by “modernising the European social model with its developed system of 
                                                 
41 It has to be noted, that the all goals address many other issues, such as innovation, technology and life 
long learning, but these subjects fall outside the scope of the project, as mentioned in the delimitations. 
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social protection” (Consilium: 12). But it is still important that the social systems are 
able to create an active welfare state, which ensures, that work pays (Consilium: 12)    
3. Promoting social inclusion 
Social inclusion and social cohesion are important objectives, because an unacceptable 
amount of people are socially excluded and living below the poverty line 
(Consilium:12). Poverty should be fought through higher levels of economic growth 
and efforts should be made to give everybody access to new knowledge to improve 
skills as “the best safeguard against social exclusion is a job”( Consilium:13) 
4. Coordinating macro economic policies: fiscal consolidation, quality and 
sustainability of public finances. 
Macro economic policies should foster the transition towards knowledge based 
economy, and by preserving macro economic stability and stimulate growth and 
employment. Employment should thus be achieved while maintaining a stability-
oriented monetary policy supported by sound fiscal policies in a context of wage 
moderation and low inflation- and interest-rates (Consilium: 1). Furthermore the 
growth provided by the implementation of the strategy should be used to improve the 
sustainability of public finances, and pursue fiscal consolidation more actively 
(Consilium: 9) In order to do this, the goals are to be reached primarily by relying on 
the private sector, as well as through partnerships between private and public 
organisations (Consilium: 15) 
5. Creating a friendly environment for starting up and developing innovative 
businesses especially SMEs 
 Especially SMEs are seen as the primary source of new jobs in the EU, therefore the 
costs of doing business should be lowered, as should the level of bureaucratic obstacles  
(Consilium: 6).  These initiatives are presented in order to increase the competitiveness 
and dynamic of the SMEs. 
 
- Implementing a new open method of coordination 
Many of the initiatives in the Lisbon Strategy are very vaguely formulated as the idea 
of best practice is introduced in the Lisbon Strategy. The idea behind best practices is, 
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in very short terms, to observe how different Member States handle problems. The 
Member States who has the best practice is to be a model for the rest of the EU 
(Consilium: 14-15). 
 
12.1. Critique of the Lisbon Strategy: 
Will the suggestions given in the Lisbon Strategy be able to create more jobs in the 
EU? In our opinion there are some problems with the strategy. The strategy is very 
preoccupied with upgrading the labour force and improving the opportunities for 
setting up SMEs. There is also much consideration about the educational level and 
flexibility of the labour force. In combination with the suggestion to “make work pay”, 
while sowing wage moderation it gives the idea that the reasons companies are not 
hiring in Europe is solely a question of an inadequate labour force. There aren’t any 
considerations as to if there could be other explanations for the unemployment 
problems. In addition to this, the blatant disregard for security leaves an impression 
that the makers of the Lisbon Strategy have a very supply driven view of economics 
where there is no considerations for insecurity or demand 
 
13. The Wim Kok Report 
In 2003, an Employment Task Force (ETF) was set up to revise and analyse the 
challenges of EU in order to identify key issues. The ETF was not established to revisit 
the Lisbon Strategy, but rather to re-energise the effort of the Member states in 
obtaining the goals. This was done by identifying more practical for the Member States 
to follow, as supplement to the goals (Wim Kok 2003: 11). The ETF emphasizes the 
problematic situation that until 2002, only four of the EU15 countries, have been able 
to reform the labour market policy and achieve an employment rate above 70%, these 
are Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden and UK (Wim Kok 2003: 14) 
The Task force believes, that employment growth is the key determinant of economic 
growth, therefore Member States should not wait for higher economic growth, but do 
an effort to create a well trained and adaptable workforce, of sufficient size, to 
revitalize their economies and create economic growth ( Wim Kok 2003: 17).  
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The ETF regards the lack of ability to fulfil the employment goals as a signal of lacking 
competence in using the potential of Europe’s human resources to the full and to 
achieve high rates of economic growth. Therefore it is important to put a great effort in 
attracting people into work, and help them stay in employment. The Wim Kok report 
clearly states the need for the three elements: flexibility, security and an active labour 
market policy. Since the report is based on best performance, the Danish model is used 
as a primary example in relations to these measures. 
 
1.Promote flexibility combined with security on the labour market42 
The task force underlines that in order to improve the responsiveness of the European 
economy; a higher degree of flexibility is needed. This is to be achieved through 
revising the contractual relationship between employer and employee, wherefore it has 
to be accompanied by an adequate level of security. 
The task force argues, that resistance against implementing higher flexibility exists 
among the EU countries, as it is believed, that it creates increased insecurity for the 
workers. But flexibility has to be redefined, in the sense that flexibility should not just 
be perceived as being in the interest of the employer, but also the interest of the worker.  
(Wim Kok 2003: 27) 
The task force emphasizes that security should also be reinterpreted and thus not be 
understood as preserving a job for life, but rather be revised and understood as building 
and preserving peoples ability to remain and develop in the labour market. Security 
should thus be related to decent pay, access to lifelong learning, working conditions, 
support to unemployed, social rights when changing jobs and protection against dismal 
and discrimination (Wim Kok 2003: 28). In relation to striking the balance between 
security and flexibility, Denmark is used as one of the examples of best practice, and 
following issues are pointed out: 
                                                 
42 It has to be noted, that proposals made in relation to increasing flexibility, are also inspired by the 
Dutch system, since both countries have implemented flexicurity systems, which have proven their value 
in practice, but the suggestions are left out, due to the fact, that we look at, where the Wim report is 
inspired from the Danish system. 
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- Contracts must be revised in Europe, because it is important that employers can 
adapt the size of the workforce by interrupting contracts without unnecessary 
delay and costs. Denmark is perceived as providing a good example, since it 
has the lowest degree of job protection, which results in more liberty in contract 
making between the parties. It is highlighted that Denmark has a short period of 
notice for firing people and low financial compensation to be paid by the firm, 
which further facilitates hire and fire. 
- Adoption of social security systems to support the mobility in the labour market 
is important in order to facilitate switch between different statuses, thus 
unemployment benefits should not just support transition from employment to 
unemployment. Denmark is accentuated because it supports the low level of job 
protection with a good access to unemployment benefits and activation schemes 
(Wim Kok 2003: 28). The security level for low wage groups is perceived as 
being high and unemployment benefits of long duration. 
- Ensure there is an adequate security for workers under all forms of contracts. In 
Denmark 70% of the work force is covered by unemployment insurance and the 
remaining 30% is covered by social assistance schemes. 
- Furthermore it is noted, that Denmark makes a great effort in activation and re-
integration on the labour market, which is reflected in the fact that Denmark is 
spending the most in active labour market policy in Europe. 
 
-More should be done to make work pay. 
The task force underlines, that serious financial disincentives for people to enter and 
remain in progress in the labour market, is a problem in some Member States. 
Furthermore it is important to ensure, that each hour worked results in a net income 
gain relative to unemployment support. Taking up a job should effectively result in 
further career development, and efforts should be done to prevent people from being 
trapped in low wage or low quality jobs with recurring periods of unemployment. The 
task force is therefore encouraging Member States to prevent unemployment, inactivity 
and low pay traps by adjusting the balance between tax and benefits (Wim Kok 2003: 
33). The task force regards the unemployment benefits as being considerably high in 
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many Member States, which can create problems, if it is not combined with effective 
enforcement of job search conditions and eligibility criteria. Therefore wage level, 
benefit systems and tax systems, should be designed in a manner, which gives the 
unemployed the incentive to move from unemployment to employment. Denmark is 
regarded as a good example since it manages to maintain a high level of unemployment 
benefits, while combining it with an active labour market policy aiming at bringing 
people back to work and thus minimise the risk of unemployment traps (Wim Kok 
2003: 33).   
 
13.1.1. Strengthen the active labour market policy 
In line with the above mentioned recommendation, the task force underlines, that it is 
important to support re-integration of unemployed and inactive people into the labour 
market in order to make sure, that the potential of the work force is efficiently used. 
This is especially important in periods of economic downturns as well as for regions 
and sectors experiencing restructuring, to prevent them from becoming detached from 
the labour market.  
Reintegration of people into the labour market is necessary to an increased flexibility in 
the labour market and is also a crucial factor in providing stronger financial initiatives 
to work (Wim Kok, 2003: 36). Active labour market policy is beneficial, because its 
objective is to bring people back to work and prevent people from becoming detached 
from the labour market. It is therefore regarded as an important measure in preventing 
cyclical unemployment from becoming long term or structural (Wim kok 2003: 36)  
 
 
13.2. Critique of Wim Kok 
The Wim Kok report takes on a larger perspective than the Lisbon Strategy, and 
although it still emphasises the need to make work pay, it incorporates a more 
wholesome labour market perspective by incorporating active labour market policies as 
a tool to facilitate the move from unemployment to employment. 
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We do however find the use of the open method of coordination very naïve. We have 
spent a significant amount of time describing the history and interconnections that is 
essential for the workings of the Danish labour market. The Wim Kok rapport takes no 
consideration whatsoever to this when they imagine that other Member States can just 
copy various parts of the Danish model and then achieve employment results similar to 
Denmark.  
The feeling that the people behind the Wim Kok only have a very superficial 
knowledge about the Danish labour marked is enhanced by the references to the low 
EPL in that they see in the model. As we have discussed in chapter 6 the lack of hard 
laws concerning EPL is due to the Danish tradition for shop stewards, something that 
the Wim Kok report doesn’t mention once in it’s description of the Danish model.  
The statistical data also shows the sad fact that with a few exceptions such as Austria 
and the Netherlands the EU12 countries do not seem likely to achieve the goals of 
Lisbon. The three remaining countries in EU15; Denmark, Sweden and United 
Kingdom, already fulfilled the goals of Lisbon when the strategy was conceived. 
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Figure 32. Employment rates (Scorch: Statistical Annex of the European Economy, spring 2006)  
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14. A Post Keynesian critique 
As discussed in the analysis above the idea presented in the Lisbon Strategy and 
flexicurity are both based on a supply side view of coping with unemployment. We 
have showed in our analysis in Chapter 8 that flexicurity and the unemployment 
success does not tell the whole story. It is much more likely that effective demand has 
been the main driving factor. In this section we will try investigate if we can establish 
any trends that support our discoveries in Denmark through EU. But first we will 
discuss some of the consequences of the supply side view of solving the unemployment 
problem. 
 
14.1. The supply side dominance 
In the last decades there has been an acceptance of the monetarist concept of natural 
unemployment in European policy. This was due to the crisis in the late seventies, and 
as discussed above the main goal has since been low inflation instead of low 
unemployment. As the European economy slowed, the ETUC43 in March 2002 
expressed its concern that several EU governments, along with European employers, 
were “arguing simply for market deregulation, structural reform and yet more labour 
flexibility. This unilateral approach contradicted the balanced integrated nature of the 
Lisbon Strategy, and stressed economic reforms to the exclusion of social and 
environmental needs.” (ETUC 2005) 
It stressed the important role of the social partners, and that the European social 
dialogue and collective bargaining were essential to achieving success. In December 
2004, the ETUC Executive Committee adopted a comprehensive resolution with key 
demands for the Strategy’s mid-term review. Macroeconomic reform to stimulate 
demand and support growth by implementing a monetary policy that also has high 
growth (and not only low inflation) as its policy focus, by making the SGP more 
flexible, and by urging the European Investment Bank to make full use of its lending 
options. Above all, the ETUC insisted that social dumping, longer working hours and 
wage cuts must play no part in the second phase of the Lisbon Agenda.(ETUC 2005) 
                                                 
43 The European Trade Union Confederation 
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In February 2005, European Commission President José Manuel Barroso announced a 
major overhaul of the Lisbon Strategy, 
“Due to globalisation and new competitive pressures, stronger priority has to be given 
to more effective labour market policies. This includes a careful monitoring of the 
benefits in order to make work pay ant to attract more people into the labour market, 
reducing unemployment.” (Rodrigues: 2005, p15) 
 
“to promote a qrowth-and employment-orientated and efficient allocation of 
resources”, “to ensure that wage developments contribute to macroeconomic stability 
and growth”.(Rodrigues: 2005, p6) 
 
This is a continuance of what has been conventional wisdom in EU for at least two 
decades, that the solution to high unemployment can only be deregulation by the 
dismantling of institutions designed to protect workers against the loss of employment 
and earnings. (Howell: 2005a, p3) 
 
Unemployment is now considered to be structural due to the social benefits and low 
flexibility in employment law thus keeping wages artificially high. The classical 
argument of social benefits being too high has been proven wrong. This was shown in 
Chapter 6 were there was no correlation between a high NRR and low unemployment. 
In general European countries were there is a high NRR have actually experienced a 
lower unemployment rate than the EU average. Italy is a good example of this, having 
no long-term benefits. (See appendix 8) Even if real wages were allowed to fall this 
would create jobs that are not coherent with the Lisbon Strategies goals of Europe 
being the most competitive knowledge based economy.  
It is all in all worth considering whether labour market institutions, collective 
bargaining, unemployment benefits and employment protection laws may be preferred 
for both efficiency and equity reasons. Co-ordination of bargaining can cause the 
externalities from wage pressure to be internalised. Unemployment insurance and 
assistance can help workers in time of need and improve the match between jobs and 
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worker skills. This is were the Danish flexicurity model takes over and provides a new 
understanding of flexibility, contrary to the laissez-faire of the dominating economic 
discourse in the EU and replaces it with and understanding of the “ability to adapt 
quickly and efficiently to change”. 
 
14.2. Effective demand and Unemployment 
Jespersen points out that one of the main reasons for low unemployment in the nineties 
in countries like the US, UK Denmark and Holland was due to a stimulation of private 
consumption. (Attac 2002: 92)We have chosen to illustrate demand developments in 
six countries and compared them to the development in unemployment. The pillars 
show the development in annual growth of GDP, which consists of consumption, 
investment, government expenditure and the difference between export and imports 
this is put besides the development in unemployment. We have chosen three countries 
with high unemployment and three countries with low unemployment.44 See Appendix 
9-10.  
Our aim here is not to give a full analysis of the developments in export developments, 
government spending policy or other variables and the effect of these, but simply to try 
an establish if there might be any tendencies in Europe that might support us in our 
beliefs that an increase in effective demand might have a positive impact on 
unemployment developments. Even though it is a superficial measurement it seems that 
the three low unemployment countries give proof that aggregate demand matters for 
long-run trends. Opposite the three high unemployment countries seem to have gotten 
stuck there. The monetarist assumption that economies will return to equilibrium in the 
long run seems to justify Keynes statement, “in the long run were all dead”.  
It is worth noting that the low unemployment countries have reduced unemployment 
without major changes in either labour market regulations or the generosity of 
unemployment related benefits. Germany has experienced high unemployment even 
though its social model is quite similar two its low unemployment neighbours in 
                                                 
44 The European Kommision provides the statistical material. The data is in constant prices based on previous year’s prices 
starting as follows: NL: 1969 IT: 1970 AT: 1976 FR: 1978 DE: 1991 IE: 1995 
Data sources are Eurostat, national publications, the OECD and the European Central Bank. 
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Austria and Netherlands. This gives proof to the story that there is more to 
unemployment than labour market rigidities. (Howell 2005b: 26)  Ireland had special 
circumstances in its attraction of FDI. One of the factors explaining Irish case was the 
supplies of skilled and unskilled labour “at reasonable cost”, reflecting Ireland’s 
initially relative low level of development. However this is not proof of the 
neoclassical view as it is only when wage moderation provokes a very strong response 
from business investment that demand takes care of itself, leading to rapid increase in 
employment. (Howell 2005a: 212) Furthermore the favourable cost position was 
preserved by the succession of centralised wage agreements. Therefore wages were not 
controlled by market pressure, which might had led to much greater wage inflation than 
experienced. This understates our point in Chapter 5, that centralized wage bargaining 
with high coverage may help countries in stabilizing economies and focus on 
macroeconomic developments. Furthermore when looking at France, Italy and 
Germany, all high unemployment countries, it might give some proof to the point that 
it is intermediate levels of bargaining combined with high coverage that creates 
problems. (See appendix 8)  
 
14.3. Growth and EMU 
Another critique is pointed towards the monetarist vertical Phillips curve, which is one 
of the main arguments for keeping a tight monetary and fiscal policy in Europe. The 
vertical Phillips curve seems to be insufficient in describing the European labour 
market. Inflation in the different EU countries has converged more and more, but 
unemployment rates are still very different. This might indicate that a country specific 
macroeconomic policy is needed. But as discussed earlier both the SGP and the ECB 
makes this very difficult as interests rates must be equal for all countries and 
government spending is very limited. (Attac 2002: 83) 
 
There is if not proof, a good reason to believe that the European economy needs active 
government fiscal policies. This is in the current situation not possible as seen in 
appendix 11 all high unemployment countries have either reached ore already passed 
the limitations given by the Stability and growth pact. The only way of solving this is 
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by changing the constrains put upon countries and opening up for sensible country 
specific macroeconomic autonomy. Further more the ECB should start pursuing more 
than price stability and focusing more on growth and unemployment. 
 
15. Sum-up of the project 
What are the perspectives of flexicurity to secure the employment goals of the Lisbon 
strategy? 
 
In the project we have answered this question by first analysing the flexicurity model in 
a Danish context and thereafter discussed it in relation to the Lisbon strategy. In the 
following we will present what our conclusions of this project are. 
 
Does flexicurity work? In the Danish labour market there is a high amount of external 
numerical flexibility, which especially is shown in the average tenure for employers 
and the amount of protection of hire in time-unlimited contracts that are most common 
in Denmark. Both are comparable with the system found in UK. Internal numerical 
flexibility and functional flexibility is also found in the Danish labour market, but they 
are less pronounced. Wage-flexibility is, however, not really obvious in Denmark due 
to the high minimum wages. There is also a high security in the form of a generous 
welfare state. The NRR in Denmark is one of the highest in the world. It counters the 
risk aversion that employees could have for the high amount of external numerical 
flexibility. It is possible that the high NRR creates moral hazards among the workers. 
The active labour market policy tries to negate the free rider problematic by 
implementing a two-period system consisting of a two-year unconditional 
unemployment benefit period and a three-year mandatory activation period. Thereafter 
the unemployed must apply for means tested social security benefit. The active labour 
market policy is simultaneously supposed to upgrade the skills of the workforce, 
thereby dealing with structural unemployment and bottlenecks. Increasing the skills of 
the unemployed workers and through paid leave schemes the skills and internal 
numerical flexibility of employed workers. 
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There is however more to why the Danish labour market is efficient. The insights 
provided by the negotiated economy and Calmfors & Driffil. The centralised wage 
bargaining made between the two umbrella organisations Federation of Danish Trade 
Unions and the Confederation of Danish Employers´ associations have created a 
situation where the organisations have gained a mutual understanding of each other’s 
preferences. The centralised collective bargaining has over time also interlinked and 
interlocked more policy areas thereby recognising broader national interests, such as 
work conditions, retirement schemes and the Danish industry’s ability to compete in 
the world market, by restraining real wage increases and inflation. Apart from the 
qualitative integration of more policy areas, there has also been a quantitative 
integration of more actors, most prominent through more represented members, but 
also through more than just the macro level of national collective bargaining. The 
Steering reform decentralised many of the areas of the active labour market that is best 
carried out at regional meso level. At the same time the shop steward carries a decisive 
role since he can act on full authority of the trade unions at the micro level, mediating 
between the single employer and employee on day-to-day problems, thereby both 
avoiding a lot of red tape and national regulations. The shop steward also has his daily 
routines at the relevant workplace, thus a mutual understanding could through him be 
developed between the interests of the trade union he represents and the specific 
employer. For that reason the conventional wisdom in economic theory, that powerful 
and omnipresent labour unions are an obstruction to a flexible and efficient labour 
market, isn’t necessarily true. In Denmark it is just the opposite. 
Therefore the alleged efficiency of the Danish labour market can not only be 
contributed to the flexicurity system, but also the negotiated economy where the 
relevant negotiations are carried out at the relevant level with the relevant authority 
between the negotiators. 
 
So the theoretical reasons for why the Danish labour market should be a role model is 
in place. But what about the macroeconomic variables and the empirical reality? Is the 
flexicurity system the reason why the Danish unemployment is low, the employment 
has increased and the Phillips curve is horizontal? Obviously it isn’t because of the 
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high external numerical flexibility or the high security, since they have been a part of 
the Danish labour market for generations, and they didn’t prevent the rise of 
unemployment before 1993. The third part of the ‘golden triangle’ of flexicurity was de 
facto implemented with the labour market reform in 1994 and could have been the 
reason for the positive development. The effects of the reform are, however, not easy to 
measure (the effects of upgraded skills and changed structures of incitements).  
The effects in the form of increased hidden unemployment can be seen in the statistics. 
The positive development is mainly caused by a stimulation of effective demand due to 
the credit reform and the ‘kick-start’ of the economy. But that doesn’t rule out that the 
flexicurity system could have enhanced the effect of the increase in effective demand, 
since the high amount of external numerical flexibility could absorb and convert the 
boom in demand into a boom in employment.  
So the conclusion of the first part of the project is that flexicurity can be a useful 
structure of the labour market, but the role of the trade unions does also make the 
Danish labour market efficient. And flexicurity cannot create employment without 
effective demand. 
 
At the EU level, the Lisbon strategy gives a suggestion on how to solve the 
unemployment problem in the EU-15. It is presented within the economic frame of the 
EMU, and the goal is to reach a 70% employment rating in the EU. The strategy is 
preoccupied with upgrading the labour force and improving the opportunities for 
setting up SMEs. There is also much consideration about the educational level and 
flexibility of the labour force, along with the airy goal of social cohesion. 
The Wim Kok report revisits the Lisbon strategy and presents a new interpretation of 
what the European economies need to re-energise their economies. The focal point is 
increased employment, since it states that employment leads to growth. The solution is 
to use what later became known as flexicurity as a role model, by revising the rigid 
employment contracts that is common in the Euro-area, to increase social security 
along with an active labour market policy and make work pay.  
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So can flexicurity secure the employment goals of the Lisbon strategy? 
First of all one has to recognise the obstacles of implementing the flexicurity system: 
The main elements of the Danish flexicurity system are quite old, and assuming that 
one can convert a century old system into other labour markets and expect immediate 
results would be naïve. Yet this is not the main problem if the flexicurity is to be 
implemented. Out of the 15 EU Member States, which the Lisbon employment goals 
are directed at, 12 of them are bound by the EMU and these are the countries who 
suffer most from unemployment. Flexicurity is an expensive system, the parts of 
security and active labour market policy claims a large part of the public budget, and 
the EU-12 have already pushed there fiscal policies to the boundaries of the Stability 
and Growth Pact. The SGP, puts constrains on the member states ability to conduct 
fiscal policy, by requiring a maximum of 3% deficit and 60% government debt. The 
same measures are equal to the requirements set by the convergence criteria, meaning 
that countries entering, at a budgetary level just satisfying these criteria’s, will have 
severe problems of issuing new debt in times of recession. A lot of countries would 
have problems to maintain the SGP in an economic recession, because of increased 
unemployment payments and other automatic stabilisers (as was seen in the recent case 
of France and Germany). They wouldn’t be able to implement expensive reforms, such 
as flexicurity, which might improve their situation. In addition there is no help to be 
found in the policies of the ECB, which is constrained by the Maastricht treaty and has 
to pursue price stability (a low inflation of 2%) as the primary objective, rather than a 
loosening of the monetary policy. So the economic framework set by the EMU is not 
favourable for implementing flexicurity in its whole. 
 
But even if the obstacles could be overcome the flexicurity is hardly a Shangri-La of 
EU. If a lesson is to be learned from the Danish experience, it is that the neo classical 
conventional supply side wisdom, where the economy is self-equilibrating and 
minimum wages and powerful trade unions are the key obstacles to employment, is 
obsolete (which it has been the last 70 years), whereas stimulation of effective demand 
did work in Denmark. Flexicurity in Denmark is a useful structure, but it didn’t lower 
unemployment by itself, it needed demand stimulation. 
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From these lessons we can state several things:  
The rigid contracts, which the Wim Kok report wants to get rid of is a problem, since 
they lower flexibility, but rushing headlong into an extreme flexibility is neither 
popular in the population, nor does it lead to economic boom, since the enterprises 
might just be glad to finally get rid of the abundant workers, thereby increasing 
unemployment and lowering the effective demand which they feed upon. 
The economic framework of the EMU has probably just worsened the unemployment 
problem, due to its rigid boundaries of fiscal and monetary policy. The Wim Kok 
report states that only the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark had 
fulfilled the Lisbon employment goals in 2002 (later on Austria joined). Is it a 
coincidence that the United Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark are the only Member 
States who aren’t in the EMU? Not if you study the EMU with a Keynesian 
perspective. 
It isn’t a bad thing to try and gear the economies to the future, by focusing on education 
and training. After all, who is against education? But at the end of the day it is hard to 
predict anything, especially the future. Uncertainty is an important term when a 
forward-looking perspective is chosen. The point is that an open and constantly 
reflected policy is needed when it comes to making grand plans for the future.  
There are, however, good reasons to believe that a kick-start of effective demand would 
be the tool that is needed if the unemployment problems of the Euro-area are to be 
solved. Of course not a headless Keynesian policy, but one that keeps a watchful eye 
on the inflation and on unpredicted changes in the macroeconomic system, so that it 
wouldn’t repeat the history and create new narrow-minded conventional economic 
wisdom.  
So the flexicurity system is a useful labour market structure, and gearing the supply 
side of the economy for the long run can be good, but it is increased effective demand 
that provides the stimulation that economies need in order to lower unemployment. 
After all it’s just like the metaphor of a scissor: it’s uncertain which blade cuts the 
string. The same goes for supply and demand, nevertheless it’s better to rely on 
effective demand - ceteris paribus. 
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16. Conclusion 
- The flexicurity system found in the Danish labour market combines high 
external numerical flexibility, a generous welfare state and active labour market 
policy. 
- The negotiated economy is also a reason why the Danish labour market is 
efficient. 
- The low unemployment in Denmark is primarily caused by an increased 
effective demand. Flexicurity is the system that it stimulated. 
- Flexicurity can be hard if not impossible to implement in countries bound by 
the rigid conditions of the EMU. 
- In an uncertain environment, the Lisbon employment goals cannot be reached 
through wage flexibility, the effects of upgrading the workforce is dubious, 
increased effective demand is the most certain instrument to low 
unemployment. 
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17. Perspectives 
In the project there is a lot of focus on the barriers and incentives for unemployed 
persons to take a job. As this is a project, which concerns itself primarily with 
economics, it is perhaps not surprising that we almost exclusively focus on economic 
incentives, but as it is suggested several places in the project this is perhaps not entirely 
satisfactory to look only at economic incentives for unemployed people, especially in 
the Danish case. In chapter 6 we tell that the NRR in Denmark is 80%, and even higher 
for those at the bottom of the wage ladder. This combined with the very high income 
tax in Denmark means that the people at the bottom, should have very little incitements 
to take a job, they would be in a position were the chance of moral hazard should be 
very predominant. Of course there is the active labour market policies, and this can 
perhaps explain what happens for those who are only entitled to social security 
benefits. But then what about those who get unemployment benefits, they can receive 
these for two years before they are force into activation. And yet even in this group one 
can observe people looking for work long before they are forced to do so. So how can 
we explain this using our theories? Well the thing is that we really can’t. We can’t, 
probably because we do not include psychological and sociological theories. From the 
above one must assume that these have an impact on the individual’s incentives to 
work. Perhaps the average Danish psyche is constructed in a way where work is seen as 
the meaning of life. Perhaps the Danish society is arranged in such a way that work is 
equal to prestige, it is how we judge one another. Our occupation becomes a measure 
for our success in life. These are aspects that we find would be of great importance to 
uncover the full reason for how the Danish model works, especially if the model is to 
be exported to other EU countries. If the model works as it does in Denmark because of 
a particular Danish mind set, there is no telling what would happen if it was 
implemented in a culture where other life aspects took precedents over work. However 
these questions are not for us to answer but for sociologists, psychiatrics and 
anthropologists. So if the gentlemen and ladies of the EU really want to know if the 
flexicurity model is for all of Europe perhaps they should consult these people instead 
of the usual monetarist economists.   
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odtagere i hele tal
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odtagere på fuldtid
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1987
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1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
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2004100
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2115125
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1 Landbrug, fiskeri og råstofudvinding
178018
171666
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545207
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469405
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15240
15479
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D
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80511
82331
83839
80614
81878
85843
90317
 A
nlæ
gsvirksom
hed
28078
27217
27967
27571
29511
24703
24820
21816
22237
21935
22792
23960
25710
24658
25170
5 H
andel, hotel og restauration
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
 A
utohandel, service og tankstationer
62917
63355
57664
53982
53478
55314
54706
55239
56372
58315
59835
59877
61653
61833
60504
 A
utohandel
28107
27753
26839
25261
25429
26477
25814
24622
24885
25223
25767
27688
29304
28870
27872
 A
utoreparation
22652
23804
19733
18917
18263
18246
18411
20322
21572
21973
23082
20941
20578
23775
22972
 Tankstationer
12157
11799
11091
9804
9786
10591
10481
10296
9915
11119
10986
11248
11771
9188
9660
 E
ngroshandel undtagen m
ed biler
155529
161250
162438
163387
162910
160699
159145
154409
155714
161232
165512
166920
174485
179161
175432
 E
ngroshandel undtagen m
ed biler
155529
161250
162438
163387
162910
160699
159145
154409
155714
161232
165512
166920
174485
179161
175432
 D
etailh. og reparationsvirks. undt. biler
199011
192726
184904
182384
180681
176883
176170
174280
176917
182066
188835
185451
191614
196966
199755
 D
etailhandel m
ed fødevarer m
v.
66871
64896
61389
61892
60201
61563
64587
64640
65168
68788
71779
70257
71953
73324
73694
 V
arehuse og storm
agasiner
18972
18414
17428
16078
22781
19526
20970
21573
24410
26070
26333
25042
26362
27632
28210
 A
poteker og m
aterialister 
11116
10788
10173
10302
9278
9690
9166
8541
7959
8059
8395
8385
8606
8239
8678
 D
etailhandel m
ed beklæ
dning og fodtøj
28049
27219
25681
23406
22928
22297
21236
20854
21083
21995
22224
21589
22145
22894
23107
 D
etailhandel i øvrigt, reparationsvirksom
hed 
74003
71409
70233
70706
65494
63806
60211
58671
58298
57154
60104
60178
62548
64877
66066
 H
oteller og restauranter
64048
65715
64379
65249
66563
67178
67594
67621
70757
74869
77794
77496
80355
82443
82890
 H
oteller
17904
18389
18034
19031
18248
17993
18647
19171
20413
19694
20190
19707
20175
20680
20631
 R
estauranter
46144
47326
46345
46219
48316
49185
48947
48450
50343
55175
57604
57789
60180
61763
62259
6 Transport, post og tele
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
 Land-, rørtransport
76176
78096
75101
73876
73136
72825
73057
71382
71518
73097
72478
71076
71281
72423
72474
 Transport
127111
128831
127833
128347
129445
129865
130225
126880
127660
131918
130901
129050
129283
131844
131420
 Jernbaner
13169
12767
12877
13040
15994
15225
15543
14641
13522
12899
12042
11132
10382
10248
9810
 B
us- og S
-togstrafik m
v., rutefart
16369
16794
16935
16511
12936
12705
12368
11682
12385
12976
13395
12450
13260
13339
12975
 Taxi- og turistvognm
æ
nd
8975
9237
8611
8523
8589
8573
8738
10195
10573
11931
12168
12517
12618
13197
13556
 Fragtvognm
æ
nd m
v., rørtransport
37663
39299
36678
35801
35616
36322
36409
34863
35038
35291
34873
34977
35021
35639
36133
 S
kibsfart
16013
15318
15813
17034
18235
18891
20367
20706
20430
20781
19560
18930
18193
17456
16473
 Lufttransport
9411
9703
10483
9974
10479
10988
9366
8133
8248
9009
9393
9620
10052
11447
11543
 H
jæ
lpevirksom
hed til transport
25511
25714
26436
27463
27595
27161
27435
26660
27464
29031
29470
29424
29757
30518
30930
 H
jæ
lpevirksom
hed i forb. m
ed transport, rejsebureau
16464
16429
16227
16591
16141
16989
16127
15906
16423
17166
17828
17549
17679
18115
18275
 A
nden transportform
idling
9047
9286
10209
10872
11454
10172
11308
10754
11041
11865
11642
11875
12078
12403
12655
 P
ost og tele
51310
54170
55834
55236
53637
53875
54307
50325
51114
48336
50067
51570
52257
54422
54634
 Finansiering
60704
63523
62934
63225
61591
61149
58065
55730
54389
57221
55294
56548
55424
55483
56277
 Finansiering og forsikring
81284
85723
84326
85071
83668
82099
78653
75411
72999
76158
76935
77691
76483
77002
77484
 P
engeinstitutter
50543
52888
52377
52622
51262
50895
48324
46885
45713
48789
47012
47717
46143
45280
45450
 R
ealkreditinstitutter
10161
10635
10557
10603
10329
10254
9741
8846
8676
8432
8282
8831
9281
10203
10827
 Forsikring
15782
17171
16321
16812
17120
15878
15792
15776
15587
15436
17790
17696
17529
17926
17440
 Livs- og pensionsforsikring
1672
1819
1761
1499
1801
1959
2398
2387
2377
2630
2762
3039
2401
2585
2454
 A
nden forsikringsvirksom
hed
14110
15352
14560
15313
15319
13920
13394
13389
13210
12806
15028
14657
15128
15341
14986
 Finansiel service
4798
5029
5071
5034
4957
5071
4796
3905
3023
3501
3851
3447
3530
3593
3767
7 Finansiering og forretningsservice
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
 E
jendom
sudlejning og -form
idling
30791
32428
32266
32830
31954
31820
32471
31883
30870
31583
32009
33801
33608
33554
33601
 U
dlejning og ejendom
sform
idling
36345
38456
38686
39648
38683
38708
38818
37325
36926
37625
38517
40121
40298
40604
40670
 E
jendom
sm
æ
glervirksom
hed m
v.
6165
6028
5955
6296
6500
6918
6944
6485
6722
8352
8764
9544
9684
9905
9880
 B
oliger
19071
20335
20288
20513
19818
19505
19886
19653
18679
18623
18520
19099
18688
18091
17700
 U
dlejning af erhvervsejendom
m
e m
v.
5556
6066
6024
6021
5636
5396
5641
5745
5469
4608
4725
5158
5236
5558
6021
 U
dlejning af transportm
idler og m
askiner
5554
6028
6420
6818
6729
6888
6348
5442
6056
6042
6508
6320
6690
7050
7069
 U
dlejning af transportm
idler og m
askiner
5554
6028
6420
6818
6729
6888
6348
5442
6056
6042
6508
6320
6690
7050
7069
 It-service
18086
20267
20640
21926
21972
22495
21293
21538
22660
22487
22013
27786
30110
35072
40706
 Forretningsservice
140921
149182
155526
162676
158473
161804
161286
161188
166495
172125
177835
194971
203327
217486
232735
 It-service bortset fra levering af softw
are
5120
5837
6400
6673
6719
6694
6128
6173
6779
7048
8693
11332
9748
9946
9864
Levering af program
m
el og konsulentbistand i forb. m
12965
14430
14239
15253
15253
15801
15165
15365
15881
15439
13320
16454
20362
25126
30842
 Forskning og udvikling
11588
11657
10242
10529
10684
11041
9685
7138
6797
6109
6598
6117
6420
7477
8177
 Forskning og udvikling (m
arkedsm
æ
ssig)
4576
4623
3217
3272
3403
3538
3806
1937
1951
1812
2037
1456
1627
2216
3236
Forskning og udvikling (anden ikke-m
arkedsm
æ
ssig)
7012
7034
7025
7258
7281
7503
5879
5201
4846
4297
4561
4661
4793
5261
4941
 R
ådgivning og rengøring m
v.
111247
117257
124644
130220
125817
128268
130308
132513
137038
143529
149224
161068
166797
174937
183852
 A
dvokatvirksom
hed
8496
9653
9543
10551
10238
10536
10505
10485
10519
11004
10848
11208
11037
10954
11100
 R
evisions og bogføringsvirksom
hed
14951
16241
15998
18438
19464
19602
18340
18384
17971
18845
18917
19653
19108
18637
18523
 R
ådgivende ingeniører, arkitekter
32985
33721
33053
35323
35867
35642
34173
34539
34804
36588
38154
41289
42133
41623
41190
 R
eklam
e og m
arkedsføring
8870
9007
9035
9445
9093
8919
9471
9055
9387
10361
10417
11328
12610
13772
14685
 R
engøringsvirksom
hed
18507
19654
27470
27193
26163
28483
28816
28869
29658
29131
31112
32992
33303
35660
38268
 A
nden forretningsservice
27438
28982
29545
29270
24991
25086
29003
31181
34700
37600
39776
44598
48606
54291
60086
 O
ffentlig adm
inistration
209920
206190
205625
205742
203943
203932
212816
206857
223624
221291
212244
206733
210027
207324
197637
 G
enerel offentlig adm
inistration
59126
57941
59077
57391
54285
55747
61198
59423
62143
63832
62455
59245
57820
55152
54307
O
ffentlig sektoradm
inistration bortset fra vedr. erhver
51728
51341
50466
51394
52302
52713
57341
57953
56922
58157
55137
53296
57624
54614
52124
O
ffentlig adm
inistration vedrørende erhverv, infrastru
26279
25751
23599
24146
25068
24006
26589
25630
28242
27769
24556
23948
23409
23157
21189
 Forsvar, politi og retsvæ
sen
72788
71157
72484
72810
72289
71465
67688
63851
76317
71533
70096
70244
71174
74401
70017
8 O
ffentlige og personlige tjeneste
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
 U
ndervisning
174919
175866
183941
181329
176734
177741
173140
178533
192884
189086
193761
196570
195861
197258
198282
 Folkeskoler
85673
86287
90005
90442
87498
87453
85239
84115
90185
89082
92621
93724
96419
98117
98018
 G
ym
nasier og erhvervsfaglige skoler
38563
38816
40637
39227
38396
38393
37657
39271
39889
39496
39318
43892
40478
41747
40890
 V
ideregående uddannelsesinstitutioner
27990
28209
29599
28591
27990
27983
27261
27597
30675
29278
29639
28877
28400
28557
29561
 V
oksenundervisning m
v. (m
arkedsm
æ
ssig)
3126
2912
3059
3025
3198
3568
3831
4533
4619
4573
4451
4470
4539
4690
4456
V
oksenundervisning m
v. (anden ikke-m
arkedsm
æ
ss
19566
19642
20641
20044
19651
20343
19152
23017
27516
26657
27732
25607
26025
24147
25357
 S
undhedsvæ
sen 
133215
133931
135656
135612
140782
142835
142137
142164
141023
141228
143159
147756
143523
147905
148211
 H
ospitaler
87933
88457
96586
94087
97627
97535
95358
92860
93789
94800
96853
101775
96468
97328
97221
 Læ
ger, tandlæ
ger, dyrlæ
ger
45282
45475
39069
41526
43155
45300
46780
49304
47233
46428
46306
45981
47055
50577
50990
 S
undhedsvæ
sen 
133215
133931
135656
135612
140782
142835
142137
142164
141023
141228
143159
147756
143523
147905
148211
 S
ociale institutioner for børn og unge
101142
104109
106395
108887
111968
113989
106152
107534
105621
101993
110461
115121
116139
120442
122049
 S
ociale institutioner for voksne
140344
144546
146847
148285
147633
142766
149210
145405
142853
146766
146751
154639
167884
170518
173393
 S
ociale institutioner 
241486
248655
253242
257172
259601
256755
255362
252939
248474
248759
257212
269760
284023
290960
295442
Appendix 2: Effektiv efterspørgsel (løbende, mio. kr.)
Udvalgte hovedkontoindikatorer 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
B.1*g Bruttonationalprodukt, BNP 720942 748274 788600 825310 857652 887868 900153 965718 1009756
P.51+P.53 Faste bruttoinvesteringer mv. 190055 178238 176845 173145 167405 164007 157523 169547 189298
Løbende indtægter fra udlandet i alt 258936 290360 325474 355011 395233 426803 449847 480444 495366
Løbende udgifter fra udlandet i alt 279933 301029 337858 351584 387612 407714 424634 465628 488212
P.3 Offentlig forbrugsudgift 237107 236810 234850 234378 235799 237713 247555 254870 260299
P.3 Privat forbrugsudgift 464346 454528 454039 454311 461622 470389 472690 503350 509551
P.1 Produktion 1200898 1250377 1332335 1390114 1430578 1467742 1487008 1584234 1663164
Udvalgte hovedkontoindikatorer 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
B.1*g Bruttonationalprodukt, BNP 1060888 1116324 1155407 1207749 1278956 1322951 1350787 1390537 1446471
P.51+P.53 Faste bruttoinvesteringer mv. 196799 218240 240286 243872 260657 270440 276612 280632 293915
Løbende indtægter fra udlandet i alt 520332 511928 513825 552322 686437 713255 705366 699071 736372
Løbende udgifter fra udlandet i alt 504897 507488 524069 531166 667811 672792 677787 653218 700553
P.3 Offentlig forbrugsudgift 269085 271334 279783 285299 287852 295601 301922 305076 307312
P.3 Privat forbrugsudgift 522160 537195 549335 553049 549042 547960 551375 556076 580098
P.1 Produktion 1738559 1828867 1890401 1981836 2161355 2280872 2322373 2360775 2466897
Forbrugsudgifter 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
C = Personal consumption expenditures 464346 454528 454039 454311 461622 470389 472690 503350 509551
I = Private domestic investments 190055 178238 176845 173145 167405 164007 157523 169547 189298
G = Government consumption expenditures 237107 236810 234850 234378 235799 237713 247555 254870 260299
[E-Im] = net export of goods and services -20997 -10669 -12385 3425 7620 19083 25210 14821 7153
Effective demand 870511 858907 853349 865259 872446 891192 902978 942588 966301
Forbrugsudgifter 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
C = Personal consumption expenditures 522160 537195 549335 553049 549042 547960 551375 556076 580098
I = Private domestic investments 196799 218240 240286 243872 260657 270440 276612 280632 293915
G = Government consumption expenditures 269085 271334 279783 285299 287852 295601 301922 305076 307312
[E-Im] = net export of goods and services 15436 6864 -9950 23216 18208 41822 34116 45782 33329
Effective demand 1003480 1033633 1059454 1105436 1115759 1155823 1164025 1187566 1214654
Appendix 3: Effektiv efterspørgsel (faste 1995 priser, mio. kr.)
Udvalgte hovedkontoindikatorer 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
B.1*g Bruttonationalprodukt, BNP 912523 905802 907163 915918 926130 931786 931773 982704 1009756
P.51+P.53 Faste bruttoinvesteringer mv. 190055 178238 176845 173145 167405 164007 157523 169547 189298
P.6 Eksport af varer og tjenester 263200 283246 295225 313436 332587 329571 324768 347360 357454
P.7 Import af varer og tjenester 236784 249296 259441 262616 270484 269384 262228 294500 316144
P.3 Offentlig forbrugsudgift 237107 236810 234850 234378 235799 237713 247555 254870 260299
P.3 Privat forbrugsudgift 464346 454528 454039 454311 461622 470389 472690 503350 509551
P.1 Produktion 1492068 1501728 1502888 1525590 1528531 1533026 1545112 1617576 1663164
Udvalgte hovedkontoindikatorer 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
B.1*g Bruttonationalprodukt, BNP 1035188 1065929 1092236 1121019 1152767 1167815 1173687 1181940 1210177
P.51+P.53 Faste bruttoinvesteringer mv. 196799 218240 240286 243872 260657 270440 276612 280632 293915
P.6 Eksport af varer og tjenester 372900 388326 404870 454494 515740 538314 563886 554868 576966
P.7 Import af varer og tjenester 327357 360111 392031 413591 469458 485663 520977 513598 551722
P.3 Offentlig forbrugsudgift 269085 271334 279783 285299 287852 295601 301922 305076 307312
P.3 Privat forbrugsudgift 522160 537195 549335 553049 549042 547960 551375 556076 580098
P.1 Produktion 1707573 1755817 1812566 1879628 1964659 2026349 2046765 2053044 2098517
Forbrugsudgifter 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995
C = Personal consumption expenditures 464346 454528 454039 454311 461622 470389 472690 503350 509551
I = Private domestic investments 190055 178238 176845 173145 167405 164007 157523 169547 189298
G = Government consumption expenditures 237107 236810 234850 234378 235799 237713 247555 254870 260299
[E-Im] = net export of goods and services 26416 33950 35784 50820 62103 60187 62540 52860 41310
Effective demand 917924 903526 901518 912654 926929 932296 940308 980627 1000458
Forbrugsudgifter 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
C = Personal consumption expenditures 522160 537195 549335 553049 549042 547960 551375 556076 580098
I = Private domestic investments 196799 218240 240286 243872 260657 270440 276612 280632 293915
G = Government consumption expenditures 269085 271334 279783 285299 287852 295601 301922 305076 307312
[E-Im] = net export of goods and services 45543 28215 12839 40903 46282 52651 42909 41270 25244
Effective demand 1033587 1054984 1082243 1123123 1143833 1166652 1172818 1183054 1206569
A
ppendix 4: H
elårsm
odtagere af indkom
sterstattende ydelser efter ydelsesart
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
G
ross
I alt
1345872
1366388
1411528
1446242
1450596
1497614
1529456
1587917
1576313
1640875
U
nem
ploym
ent benefits
A
rbejdsløshedsdagpenge
171013
172777
189274
205097
209890
229392
241335
272853
264425
231397
S
ickness benefits
S
ygedagpenge
37303
42899
45688
44146
41698
36666
36119
37527
38095
41952
M
aternity leave benefits
B
arselsdagpenge
28071
29228
30078
30570
31770
32159
33832
34308
34934
36064
S
ocial benefits
K
ontanthjæ
lp
94958
93659
107343
113553
115173
143879
149719
158377
122769
102223
R
ehabilitation
R
evalidering
13604
14283
22360
24776
22428
13298
16004
17646
15458
16734
O
ld-age pension
Folkepension
643827
654480
661359
667908
668680
672541
674711
676898
675536
677835
D
isablem
ent pension
Førtidspension
234051
237194
239164
245635
245039
249036
251263
260103
260903
267212
C
ivil servant pension
Tjenestem
andspension
33361
35754
27191
27495
29204
29913
32740
30822
28275
0
E
arly retirem
ent
E
fterløn
89684
86115
89070
87062
86714
90730
93730
99383
103574
136406
P
ublic activation
K
om
m
unal aktivering
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
32344
38246
P
rivate activation
A
F-aktivering
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
14292
P
aid leave schem
es
O
rlovsydelser
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
78517
V
acancy benefits
Ledighedsydelse
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
200 4
G
ross
I alt
1622229
1599126
1568277
1540689
1531294
1532193
1541578
1569168
1582460
U
nem
ploym
ent benefits
A
rbejdsløshedsdagpenge
194415
172195
144581
125079
123686
119643
116792
144198
149405
S
ickness benefits
S
ygedagpenge
47088
49503
49759
49441
54458
59486
62427
65747
66937
M
aternity leave benefits
B
arselsdagpenge
35201
35654
34801
35396
34468
33857
34897
51455
53912
S
ocial benefits
K
ontanthjæ
lp
97650
95978
91846
86506
88558
90665
93990
92799
101950
R
ehabilitation
R
evalidering
17972
19537
21828
27947
28100
26447
25082
24762
23189
O
ld-age pension
Folkepension
671107
674278
673101
672499
671364
669914
672510
671926
682397
D
isablem
ent pension
Førtidspension
264411
268486
267039
263614
257560
254612
258824
258741
257887
C
ivil servant pension
Tjenestem
andspension
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
E
arly retirem
ent
E
fterløn
166153
169482
184229
177580
179057
178846
180643
185646
189634
P
ublic activation
K
om
m
unal aktivering
40646
40795
41664
44502
46199
47674
47597
46616
32485
P
rivate activation
A
F-aktivering
25693
29858
23096
26530
23798
27734
28726
17933
13645
P
aid leave schem
es
O
rlovsydelser
61893
43359
36331
31597
24046
22288
17933
4410
2914
V
acancy benefits
Ledighedsydelse
0
0
0
0
0
1027
2157
4935
8105
A
ppendix 5: Ledige
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
P
rocent af arbejdsstyrken
7,9
7,9
8,7
9,5
9,7
10,6
11,3
12,4
12,3
10,4
8,9
7,9
6,6
5,7
5,4
5,2
5,2
6,2
6,4
5,7
Fatiske tal
220408
221852
243864
264933
271670
296106
318285
348817
343424
288376
245621
220159
182721
158190
150491
145077
144732
170608
176388
157436
A
ppendix 6: Forbrugerprisindeks, gennem
snitlig årlig inflation (1900=100)
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Å
rsstigning i procent
3,7
4
4,5
4,8
2,6
2,4
2,1
1,3
2
2,1
2,1
2,2
1,8
2,5
2,9
2,4
2,4
2,1
1,2
1,8
Appendix 7: Obligationsrentegennemsnit & Nationalbankens Diskonto
Månedlig rente
Samtlige serier (Obligationsrentegennemsnit)
Nationalbankens Diskonto
1986M01 1986M02 1986M03 1986M04 1986M05 1986M06 1986M07 1986M08 1986M09 1986M10 1986M11 1986M12
10,26 9,78 9,5 9,19 9,87 10,14 10,81 11,63 10,96 11,04 11,81 11,61
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1987M01 1987M02 1987M03 1987M04 1987M05 1987M06 1987M07 1987M08 1987M09 1987M10 1987M11 1987M12
11,27 12,42 12,35 12,01 11,73 11,34 11,94 11,54 12,33 12,61 11,77 11,73
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1988M01 1988M02 1988M03 1988M04 1988M05 1988M06 1988M07 1988M08 1988M09 1988M10 1988M11 1988M12
11,11 10,81 11,21 11,45 11,04 10,6 10,43 10,51 10,21 10,05 9,98 9,81
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1989M01 1989M02 1989M03 1989M04 1989M05 1989M06 1989M07 1989M08 1989M09 1989M10 1989M11 1989M12
9,75 9,99 9,97 10,03 10,3 10,09 9,85 10,02 10,25 10,76 10,82 10,82
7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
1990M01 1990M02 1990M03 1990M04 1990M05 1990M06 1990M07 1990M08 1990M09 1990M10 1990M11 1990M12
11,02 11,67 11,12 10,94 10,77 10,7 10,47 10,94 11,3 10,99 10,95 10,91
7 7 7 8 8 8 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5 8,5
1991M01 1991M02 1991M03 1991M04 1991M05 1991M06 1991M07 1991M08 1991M09 1991M10 1991M11 1991M12
10,63 10,29 10,23 10,18 9,96 10,05 10,18 10,12 10,01 9,89 9,94 9,9
8,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9 9 9 9,5 9,5 9 9
1992M01 1992M02 1992M03 1992M04 1992M05 1992M06 1992M07 1992M08 1992M09 1992M10 1992M11 1992M12
9,76 9,76 9,98 9,94 9,88 10,08 10,34 10,57 10,66 10,09 10,11 10,25
9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5 9,5
1993M01 1993M02 1993M03 1993M04 1993M05 1993M06 1993M07 1993M08 1993M09 1993M10 1993M11 1993M12
9,94 10,25 9,63 9,26 8,82 8,43 8,74 8,42 8,39 8,13 8,03 7,74
9,5 9,5 10,5 9,5 9,25 8,25 7,75 9,25 9,25 8,25 7,25 6,5
1994M01 1994M02 1994M03 1994M04 1994M05 1994M06 1994M07 1994M08 1994M09 1994M10 1994M11 1994M12
7,41 7,68 7,83 7,86 8,35 8,63 8,38 9,01 9,16 9,02 8,85 9,17
6,25 5,75 5,5 5,5 5,25 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
1995M01 1995M02 1995M03 1995M04 1995M05 1995M06 1995M07 1995M08 1995M09 1995M10 1995M11 1995M12
8,96 8,83 8,96 8,72 8,26 8,59 8,35 8,07 8,09 7,91 7,57 7,4
5 5 5 6 6 6 6 5,75 5 5 5 4,75
1996M01 1996M02 1996M03 1996M04 1996M05 1996M06 1996M07 1996M08 1996M09 1996M10 1996M11 1996M12
7,21 7,51 7,35 7,05 7,25 7,25 7,18 7,1 6,81 6,77 6,65 6,55
4,25 4 4 3,75 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25
1997M01 1997M02 1997M03 1997M04 1997M05 1997M06 1997M07 1997M08 1997M09 1997M10 1997M11 1997M12
6,46 6,28 6,6 6,43 6,41 6,2 6,1 6,33 6,25 6,4 6,29 6,16
3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,25 3,5 3,5
1998M01 1998M02 1998M03 1998M04 1998M05 1998M06 1998M07 1998M08 1998M09 1998M10 1998M11 1998M12
5,99 5,92 5,92 5,98 5,87 5,78 5,7 5,79 5,77 5,63 5,47 5,4
3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,5 3,75 3,75 3,75 3,75 4,25 4,25 4
1999M01 1999M02 1999M03 1999M04 1999M05 1999M06 1999M07 1999M08 1999M09 1999M10 1999M11 1999M12
5,19 5,33 5,21 5,02 5,21 5,43 5,64 5,84 5,93 6,01 6,01 5,99
3,5 3,5 3,25 3,25 2,75 2,75 2,75 2,75 2,75 2,75 2,75 3
2000M01 2000M02 2000M03 2000M04 2000M05 2000M06 2000M07 2000M08 2000M09 2000M10 2000M11 2000M12
6,18 6,14 6 6,14 6,39 6,5 6,49 6,44 6,46 6,33 6,2 6,02
3 3 3,25 3,5 3,75 3,75 4,25 4,25 4,25 4,5 4,75 4,75
2001M01 2001M02 2001M03 2001M04 2001M05 2001M06 2001M07 2001M08 2001M09 2001M10 2001M11 2001M12
5,95 5,88 5,81 6 6,04 5,93 5,79 5,67 5,5 5,35 5,44 5,62
4,75 4,75 4,75 4,75 4,75 4,5 4,5 4,5 4,25 3,75 3,75 3,25
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Appendix 10: 
Netherlands
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